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I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of American privacy law over the years
reflects the profound importance of this funda-
mental value in modern society.' The notion of
citizens living under surveillance or governmental
interference with personal decisions and behavior
runs counter to democratic principles and tradi-
* The author (Ph.D., University of Florida; M.A., Univer-
sity of Florida; B.A., Loyola University, Chicago) is an assis-
tant professor of communications in the College of Commu-
nications at The Pennsylvania State University and a Senior
Fellow of The Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment.
1 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (A
person who speaks on the phone is "surely entitled to assume
that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world."); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) ("There is necessa-
rily, and within suitably defined areas, a .. .freedom not to
speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as
freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.") (citing Estate of
Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255
(N.Y. 1968)). See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 202 (1967).
In a democratic society privacy of communication is es-
sential if citizens are to think and act creatively and con-
structively. Fear or suspicion that one's speech is being
monitored by a stranger, even without the reality of such
activity, can have a seriously inhibiting effect upon the
willingness to voice critical and constructive ideas.
Id.
2 Individual rights to "zones of privacy" have origins in
the Bill of Rights. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1965). Lawrence H. Tribe, leading constitutional law
scholar, observed that "the [F]ourth [A]mendment, more
than any other explicit constitutional provision reflects the
existence of [an individual's right to privacy]." LAWRENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1390 (1988) [herein-
after TRIBE]. The language of the Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
tions.2 Since 1890, when a New York court first
recognized a legal right to privacy,3 privacy law
has grown vast and complex. Although privacy law
developed slowly during the 20th century, 4 by the
late 1970s, the right to privacy stretched broadly
across the landscapes of tort law,
5 statutory law6
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (dictum)
(defining the constitutional right of privacy as "the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men").
3 W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 850 n.10 (1984) [hereinafter KEETON] (citing
Manola v. Stevens, N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890 (unreported)). In this
case, the court responded to a call for privacy law in an 1890
Harvard Law Review article written by Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). This article is discussed
in infra, Part II. In Manola, an actress sued a man who had
photographed her while she was on stage, clad in tights, scan-
dalous attire in those times. A New York judge enjoined the
respondent from publishing the photo. KEETON, supra at 850
n.10.
4 See Don R. Pember, The Burgeoning Scope of "Access Pri-
vacy" and the Portent for a Free Press, 64 IOWA L. REv. 1155, 1156
(1979) [hereinafter Pember].
5 Tortious claims for invasion of privacy have been recog-
nized in state statutes and in the common law and have given
rise to four civil causes of action: intrusion, appropriation,
publicity about private information and false light. See KxE-
TON, supra note 3, at 849-68.
6 In 1903, New York became the first state to legislate a
right to privacy when it enacted a statute that prohibited the
exploitation of an individual for commercial purposes. There
are numerous examples of federal privacy statutes. See, e.g.,
the Drivers Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §2721
(2000) (restricting the sale of information compiled by state
departments of motor vehicles to marketing and advertising
companies); the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18
U.S.C. §2710 (2000) (restricting disclosure by video-service
providers of individual consumer uses and customers' per-
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and constitutional law. 7 Constitutional privacy re-
stricts governmental intrusions into people's
lives,8 while statutory9 and tortious' ° privacy laws
help shield individuals from incursions by the pri-
vate sector.
Over the past generation, the term "privacy"
has captured the American imagination as never
before. Unprecedented advances in information
technology make it possible for strangers to pry
electronically into our lives and for corporations
and the government to accumulate vast stores of
sonally identifiable information); the Privacy Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C. §552a (2000) (restricting the misuse of personal data
compiled by the federal government); the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act ("FOIA") of 1966, 5 U.S.C. §552 (2000) (permit-
ting federal executive branch agencies to deny FOIA requests
for records based on specific privacy exemptions found in
the Act). See also L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting
Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (holding that a California
statute, which closes access to police records, does not violate
the First Amendment when the request was by companies
that sought to use the information for commercial pur-
poses).
7 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (hold-
ing that state and federal wiretap statutes may not bar news
media disclosures of a conversation between public officials
that was illegally taped by a third party); Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603 (1999) (holding that law enforcement agencies vio-
late an individual's Fourth Amendment privacy rights when
officers permit news media representatives to accompany of-
ficers into a home during execution of an arrest warrant);
Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999) (holding that law en-
forcement officers or personnel violate an individual's
Fourth Amendment privacy rights when they permit news
media representatives to accompany officers onto private
property during execution of a search warrant); Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of
a New York statute that required physicians to report to the
state identifying information of individuals prescribed cer-
tain drugs that had a potential for abuse); Nixon v. Adm'r of
Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (upholding the constitution-
ality of a federal law that required former President Nixon to
turn over his personal papers and other materials, such as
tapes, to federal archivists for review to determine if they
should be made public); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(holding that the Constitution does not permit the govern-
ment to prohibit a woman from terminating her pregnancy
before the fetus is viable); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (holding that the "mere private possession of obscene
matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime"); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down as uncon-
stitutional a Connecticut statute that prohibited the use and
distribution of contraceptives).
8 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
9 See infra note 6.
10 See, e.g., Sanders v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 978
P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff can sue a news
program for intrusion for hidden camera taping inside a
psychic telemarketing business under news media investiga-
tion); Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998)
personal information about us in databases."
Fear of disclosures of this kind of information,
heightened by media reports about computer
hacking and identity theft, have enhanced the ac-
ceptability of permitting the government and the
courts to control the flow of information about
citizens of the United States.' 2 Indeed, the 107th
Congress considered at least forty privacy bills,
ranging from spyware control and telemarketing
practices, to student privacy and video-voyeurism
protection. '-"
(holding that an auto accident victim can bring a claim for
intrusion against a television program that filmed her rescue
without her consent).
1 1 See William Glanz, Online Privacy Concerns Spur Bills,
THE WASH. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at B9.
12 James T. O'Reilly, author of the leading practice guide
on the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, ob-
served that to oppose efforts to "protect" or "enforce" privacy
rights is tantamount to being against "apple pie and mother-
hood."JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE:
PROCEDURES, FORMS, AND THE LAw §20.01, 20-2 (1999).
13 A few examples of the bills considered include the Pri-
vacy Commission Act, H.R. 583, 107th Cong. (2001) ("to es-
tablish the Commission for the Comprehensive Study of Pri-
vacy Protection"); the Confidential Information Privacy Act,
H.R. 2136, 107th Cong. (2001) ("to protect the confidential-
ity of [personal] information acquired from the public for
statistical purposes"); the Student Privacy Protection Act, S.
290, 107th Cong. (2001) (to provide for parental approval in
the collection of information gathered on students); the
Spyware Control and Privacy Protection Act, S. 197, 107th
Cong. (2001) ("to provide for the disclosure of the collection
of information through computer software"); the Location
Privacy Protection Act of 2001, S. 1164, 107th Cong. (2001)
("to provide for the enhanced protection of the privacy of
location information of users of location-based services and
applications"); the Telemarketing Intrusive Practices Act of
2001, S. 1881, 107th Cong. (2001) ("to require the Federal
Trade Commission to establish a list of consumers who re-
quest not to receive telephone [solicitations]"). Of the pri-
vacy bills considered in Congress, more than a dozen specifi-
cally concerned online privacy. See, e.g., Social Security On-
line Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 91, 107th Cong. (2001) ("to
regulate the use by interactive [online] computer services of
Social Security account numbers and related personally iden-
tifiable information"); the Electronic Privacy Protection Act,
H.R. 112, 107th Cong. (2001) ("to prohibit the making, im-
portation, exportation, distribution, sale, offer for sale, instal-
lation, or use of an information collection device without
proper labeling or notice and consent"); the Can Spam Act,
S. 630, 107th Cong. (2001) ("to prohibit senders of unsolic-
ited commercial electronic mail from disguising the source
of their messages"); the Online Personal Privacy Act, S. 2201,
107th Cong. (2002) ("to provide for safeguards to protect the
online privacy of persons who use the Internet"). See also
EPIC BILL TRACK, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/
bill track.html (last visited June 30, 2002); Christine Janssen,
Will the Cookie Crumble? Personal Information on the Internet
(Mar. 5, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the
2002 Annual Convention of the Western States Communica-
tion Association).
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The difficulty is that as the ambit of privacy law
expands, the amount of information available to
the public diminishes, thus blocking access to po-
tentially valuable information that the electorate
may need to make informed decisions about self-
rule. Striking an appropriate balance between an
individual's need for privacy and society's need
for information is necessary to preserve the ac-
countability principle of democracy. 14 As privacy
pioneer Alan F. Westin observed in his seminal
1967 work, Privacy and Freedom, democracies must
"set a balance between government's organiza-
tional needs for preparatory and institutional pri-
vacy and the need of the press, interest groups,
and other governmental agencies for the knowl-
edge of government operations required to keep
government conduct responsible."'
15
The purpose of this article is to examine how
the rise of constitutional privacy is affecting press
and public access to information under the gov-
ernment's control. Part II outlines the develop-
ment of constitutionally protected personal and
behavioral privacy.16 In addition, Part II discusses
how the Supreme Court has applied this form of
constitutional privacy to restrict certain longtime
newsgathering practices when balanced against
the public's legitimate interest in the informa-
tion.17 Part III examines the impact of informa-
tion privacy on public access to government
records. This section analyzes the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision that made information
privacy grounds to change an open-records law
enacted by the Ohio legislature.' 8 Part IV dis-
cusses the latest development in information pri-
vacy, a 2001 Supreme Court decision that recog-
nized for the first time a constitutional interest in
private facts in a press context.' 9 Part V offers ex-
amples of current statutory and regulatory trends
that illustrate recent official actions taken to
strengthen privacy law and also reflects an increas-
ing willingness to trade transparent governance
14 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 25 (1967).
15 Id.
16 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
17 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2001);
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977); Nixon v. Adm'r
of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977).
18 Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1069-70
(6th Cir. 1998).
19 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
20 THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREDOM OF Ex-
for enhanced privacy protection. Part VI con-
cludes that a special problem arises when consti-
tutional privacy is raised to block access to govern-
mental operations or records. Constitutional pri-
vacy trumps the federal or state laws that may al-
low access to information, thereby circumventing
the benefit of judicial balancing that would con-
sider whether the democratic value of access (a
public right to know for the purposes of self-rule
and to ensure accountability) outweighs the indi-
vidual value in privacy (one's right to control in-
formation about oneself).
II. THE RISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVACY
A. Personal and Behavioral Privacy Interests
Constitutional scholar Thomas I. Emerson has
expressed a modern and widely accepted mean-
ing of the right of privacy:
[P]rivacy [law] attempts to draw a line between the in-
dividual and the collective, between self and society. It
seeks to assure the individual a zone in which to be an
individual, not a member of the community. In that
zone he can think his own thoughts, have his own
secrets, live his own life, reveal only what he wants to
the outside world.
20
According to the Supreme Court, privacy rights
have roots that can be traced back to the Bill of
Rights and the concept of personal liberty embod-
ied in the Fourteenth Amendment. 21 A legal right
to privacy was first recognized in 189022 when a
New York court responded to Samuel D. Warren's
and Louis D. Brandeis' famed Harvard Law Review
article, which called for privacy protection and a
"right to be let alone."23 The two Boston law part-
ners wrote the article after a society column in the
Boston Saturday Evening Gazette carried an item
that described a lavish breakfast party hosted by
Warren for his daughter's wedding. Warren and
Brandeis were outraged that a gossip column
PRESSION 545 (1970).
21 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
22 See KEETON, supra note 3, at 850 n.10.
23 See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Pri-
vacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1891) [hereinafter Warren &
Brandeis]. Although a court had not recognized the right to
privacy until 1890, "the right to be let alone" had been
coined in 1888. id. at 195 (citing T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE TORTS 29 (1888)).
2003]
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would disclose a private family event.24 In their ar-
ticle they declared that news reports by the popu-
lar yellow press too often violated the privacy of
individuals.25 "The intensity and complexity of
life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have
rendered necessary some retreat from the world,"
Warren and Brandeis wrote, "and man, under the
refining influence of culture, has become more
sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy
have become more essential to the individual."26
Although the term "privacy" cannot be found in
the Constitution, over time the Supreme Court
has recognized an implicit constitutional protec-
tion for a limited right to privacy. 27 The Court
first found an implied right of privacy in the Con-
stitution in 1965 when it held that a state govern-
ment may not interfere with a married couple's
right to use contraceptives. 28 In Griswold v. Con-
necticut,29 the Court struck down a Connecticut
statute that prohibited the sale of contraceptive
devices. The Court held the state law violated a
right of privacy implied in the Bill of Rights, spe-
cifically in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Amendments. 3" Collectively, these Amend-
ments establish "zones of privacy" where individu-
als are protected from governmental intrusion. 31
Justice William 0. Douglas, writing for the Court,
said "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy." 32
The Court reinforced this implied constitu-
24 See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DE-
STRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 43 (2000).
25 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 196.
26 Id.
27 See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. According to Lawrence
Tribe, Griswold represents, among other ideas, a rule against
cramped construction and permits an implied right of pri-
vacy that can be found in the Constitution's "spirit and struc-
ture." TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1308-09.
29 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
30 Id. at 484.
3'1 Id.
32 Id. (internal citations omitted).
33 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34 Id. at 117-18, 152-54.
35 Id. at 152-53.
36 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972)
(expanding sexual privacy by striking down as unconstitu-
tional a Massachusetts statute that prohibited distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried individuals). But see Bowers v.
tional right of privacy, which protects individuals
from incursions by the state, in 1973 in Roe v.
Wade,"3 when the justices struck down a Texas law
making abortion illegal except to save the life of
the mother.34 Justice Harry A. Blackmun, who
wrote the opinion for the Court, included Four-
teenth Amendment protections for fundamental
liberties among those penumbras of privacy iden-
tified in Griswold.35 In a line of cases relying on
Griswold and Roe, the Court over the years also has
established constitutional protection for inti-
mately personal and autonomous decisions in the
areas of sexual relations, 36 marriage, 37 child rear-
ing and education.
38
The Court's recognition of privacy protection
in these rulings reflects a belief that governmental
incursions into certain areas of private life and
personal decisions are contrary to American tradi-
tions and law. A separate theory of privacy, also
grounded in personal and behavioral privacy de-
riving from Griswold, but focusing instead on
Fourth Amendment interests, emerged in a series
of 1999 cases concerning governmental coopera-
tion with journalists in search of news stories.
39
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Law enforcement authorities were deemed in
Wilson v. Layne to have violated citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights to privacy by permitting jour-
nalists to have access to a private residence during
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-92 (1986) (holding that the
right to privacy under the Constitution does not include a
right for consenting adults to engage in homosexual activity,
even in the privacy of their homes).
-7 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recogniz-
ing marriage as a fundamental right and striking down as un-
constitutional a Virginia statute that prohibited a white per-
son from marrying anyone other than another white person).
318 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-34 (1972)
(holding that Amish parents had a constitutional right, based
on their right to control their children and their religious
rights, to exempt their children from a Wisconsin compul-
sory school-attendance law); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1923) (striking down as unconstitutional an
Oregon law that required children to attend public schools);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (striking
down as unconstitutional a Nebraska statute that prohibited
teaching in any language other than English on grounds that
the law violated the rights of parents to make decisions for
their children).
39 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Hanlon v.
Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999); Lauro v. City of New York, 39 F.
Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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an authorized search for a fugitive, 40 and in Lauro
v. City of New York, for arranging a "perp walk" so
journalists could film a criminal suspect for a
news program. 41 In a third case, Hanlon v. Berger,
law enforcement authorities were held in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment for allowing CNN
reporters to accompany them onto privately
owned land during a criminal investigation. How-
ever, they were entitled to the defense of qualified
immunity.42 These rulings all relied on the ratio-
nale expressed by Justice Douglas in Griswold; pri-
vacy rights flowed from the "emanations" and
"penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Amendments. 43 Several years later, Chief
Justice Warren Burger explicitly acknowledged
the link between the Fourth Amendment and per-
sonal/behavioral privacy, writing that "[t] he Con-
stitution extends special safeguards to the privacy
of the home, just as it protects other special pri-
vacy rights such as those of marriage, procreation,
motherhood, child rearing and education."
44
The Fourth Amendment concept of privacy
that was raised in the aforementioned three cases
served to block time-honored journalistic
newsgathering practices. 45 In Wilson, the Supreme
Court unanimously held that law enforcement of-
ficers violated privacy rights implicit in the Fourth
Amendment when they permitted news reporters
to accompany them into a home during the exe-
cution of a search warrant. 46 The events that
prompted the suit began with an early morning
raid by U.S. Federal Marshals on a home in Mont-
gomery County, Maryland, that was believed to be
the residence of a fugitive named Dominic Wil-
son. 47 Wilson was a target of "Operation Gun-
smoke," a national crackdown on dangerous
criminals who were wanted for serious drug of-
fenses and violent felonies.4 8 A Gunsmoke team
40 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 605.
41 Lauro, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 363-65.
42 Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 810.
43 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965).
See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
44 United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973). "In-
deed," Tribe writes, "privacy of the home has the longest con-
stitutional pedigree of the lot." TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1412
§15-19. See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980)
(Justice Stevens adhered to the Fourth Amendment in writ-
ing that in no setting is "the zone of privacy more clearly de-
fined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual's home."). See also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (recognizing that "the
Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places").
45 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Hanlon v.
of U.S. Marshals and local police raided the resi-
dence where Wilson was believed to be hiding on
April 16, 1992. Officers were accompanied by a re-
porter and photographer from The Washington
Post.49 These so-called press "ride-alongs" were a
common and longtime practice in which news re-
porters accompanied law enforcement officials on
arrests and property searches.
50
The occupants of the home, Charles and Geral-
dine Wilson, the parents of the suspect, were in
bed when they heard police enter the residence.
Charles Wilson investigated the situation while
still dressed in his sleepwear. When he saw several
men in street clothes brandishing guns, he angrily
demanded that they explain what they were doing
in his house. Believing that Charles Wilson was
the suspect, officers wrestled him to the floor.
51
After Charles Wilson's identity was determined,
the Gunsmoke team and the Washington Postjour-
nalists left. During the raid, the Washington Post
photographer took numerous photographs, and
the reporter observed the confrontation between
officers and Charles Wilson.52  The Wilsons
brought suit against the federal government in
U.S. District Court on a claim that their Fourth
Amendment privacy rights were violated.5 3 The
district court denied a motion for summary judg-
ment filed by the U.S. Marshal's Office and the
Montgomery County Sheriff's Department. 54 On
appeal, the Third Circuit ruled that the officers
had a "qualified immunity" from damages be-
cause the question of "media presence during a
police entry into a residence" as a violation of the
Fourth Amendment had never been clearly estab-
lished. 55
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Third Cir-
cuit's ruling, but the Court also considered the
Fourth Amendment question, which the appeals
Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999); Lauro v. City of New York, 39 F.
Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
46 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614.
47 Id. at 606-08.
48 Id. at 606.
49 Id. at 606-07.
50 Id. at 615-16 (citing Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340
So.2d 914, 918 (1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 930, 53 L.Ed. 2d
245, 97 S.Ct. 2634 (1977) (holding it is a "'widespread prac-
tice of long-standing"' for media to accompany officers into
homes").
51 Id. at 607.
52 Id. at 607-08.





court had sidestepped in its ruling.5 6 The Court
held that "it is a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment for police to bring members of the media or
other third parties into a home during the execu-
tion of a warrant when presence of the third par-
ties" was not necessary to aid in the warrant's exe-
cution.5 7 The Court acknowledged that "the con-
stitutional question presented" in the case was "by
no means open and shut. '5 8 Recognizing that
"[a]ccurate media coverage of police activities
serves an important public purpose," and "ride-
alongs" were a common police practice, 59 the
Court observed, however, that privacy rights in
one's home have a tradition that can be traced
back to 1604 when an English court made the
declaration that the "house of every one is to him
as his castle and fortress." 60 The Court said the
Fourth Amendment "embodies this centuries-old
principle of respect for the privacy of the
home."6 1 Although the officers had a warrant that
lawfully permitted them to enter the Wilsons'
home, "it does not necessarily follow that they
were entitled to bring a newspaper reporter and a
photographer with them. ' 62 Reasoning that the
"presence of reporters inside the home was not
related to the objectives of the authorized intru-
sion" - the arrest of Dominic Wilson - the Court
concluded that police violated the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of the fugitive's parents.63
In deciding a similar privacy-rights issue at the
same time as Wilson, the Court ruled that a
rancher's Fourth Amendment rights were violated
when CNN joined federal agents who raided a
75,000-acre ranch in Montana. 64 In Hanlon v. Ber-
ger, the Court held that U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice agents, who executed a search warrant on a
rancher suspected of killing eagles, violated the
rancher's constitutional rights because agents per-
mitted a CNN news crew to accompany them on
the raid.65 The Wildlife Service had agreed to give
CNN exclusive rights to the story. A CNN news
56 Id. at 609-11.
57 Id. at 614.
58 Id. at 615.
59 Id. at 615-16.
60 Id. at 609-10 (citing Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194,
5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 195 (K.B. 1604)). See also 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 223
(Wayne Morrison ed., Cavendish Publ'g Ltd. 2001) (1765).
61 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 610.
62 Id. at 611.
63 Id.
64 Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 809.
crew joined the agents when the warrant was
served and also filmed the search for evidence on
the ranch's property and outbuildings. The news
crew did not enter the Berger's residence, but the
lead agent who entered the home of Paul Berger
wore a transmitter so that the crew could hear the
conversation between the agent and Berger. The
Court concluded that the facts alleged in Berger
constituted a Fourth Amendment violation as es-
tablished under Wilson.66 However, the Court also
held that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was
protected from civil liability under the "qualified
immunity doctrine" - they were law enforcement
officers serving a properly executed search war-
rant. CNN did not qualify for such protection,
however, and thus it was civilly liable for damages
for intrusion even though its photographers ac-
companied the agents with the agents' permission
and cooperation.
The Fourth Amendment principle of privacy
also was successfully invoked in a 1999 news me-
dia case concerning a New York "perp walk. ' 67 A
"perp walk" is a police term that refers to escort-
ing a criminal suspect outside a precinct station
for the news media. 68 In Lauro v. City of New York,
the court found that a burglary suspect's privacy
rights were violated when police took him on a
"perp walk," which was filmed and later broadcast
by a local television station.69 John Lauro, Jr., a
Manhattan doorman, had been accused of bur-
glarizing a residence in the building where he
worked while the tenants were on vacation in Sep-
tember 1995.70 The alleged burglary took place
while Lauro was checking the unit at the request
of the tenant, who had asked Lauro to drop off
mail and water plants.71 Unknown to Lauro, the
tenant had set up a hidden baby camera that
taped Lauro's movements in the apartment.72 Af-
ter the tenant returned, he viewed the twenty-min-
ute tape and saw Lauro looking in several drawers
65 Id. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service had obtained
the warrant for the ranch due to the owner's unlawful taking
of wildlife. Id.
66 Id.
67 Lauro v. City of New York, 39 F. Supp. 2d 351
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (reversed and remanded on the issue of the po-
lice officer's qualified immunity).
68 Id, at 357.
(;9 Id. at 354.
70 Id. at 354-55, 357.
71 Id. at 355.
72 Id.
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in the unit on different occasions. 73 The tenant
sold the tape to New York's Fox 5 News for $200
and then filed burglary charges against Lauro
with the New York police.
7 4
After Lauro's arrest, a local television station
asked the police to take him on a "perp walk"
outside the precinct station.75 Journalists often
are notified of a "perp walk" in advance by police
seeking publicity in an arrest; sometimes, "perp
walks" are staged at the request of the news me-
dia, usually local television stations in search of
easy film footage to accompany televised news re-
ports. 7 6 Lauro's "perp walk" was requested by Fox
5 News, which later filmed a handcuffed Lauro as
officers took him from a police cruiser into the
station.77 That footage was later broadcast on the
news program, along with the baby-camera foot-
age of Lauro rifling through the apartment.
78
Lauro brought suit against the City of New York,
claiming the "perp walk" violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.7 9 The District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that police vi-
olated Lauro's privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment, which prohibits "unreasonable
searches and seizures." s0 The district court said
the filming and publication of Lauro's image dur-
ing the "perp walk" was an unlawful seizure of his
"image" and invaded the suspect's privacy."' The
court reasoned that in addition to one's person
and residence, illegal seizures under the Fourth
Amendment also apply to "intangibles such as
plaintiffs own image and the sound of his
voice." 82 The court asserted further that the "perp
walk" was conducted to humiliate the suspect, and
it offered no legitimate law enforcement objective
or justification:8 3
In addition to the indignity of the walk itself is the fact
73 Id. at 356.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 357.
76 Id. at 367.
77 Id. at 357.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 354.
80 Id. at 363-64. See also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
81 Lauro, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 363-64.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 363.
85 See, e.g., Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 194
F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a supermarket com-
pany can recover damages for "breach of duty of loyalty" and
trespass in a case in which two ABC reporters assumed false
identities to get jobs and used hidden cameras to expose un-
that the police were aware that the walk was to be fea-
tured on the Fox 5 News and exposed to the entire New
York metropolitan area. All this in a nation where an
accused is presumed to be innocent until proven other-
wise.
8 4
The cases discussed in this section are among a
growing list of legal challenges in which the news
media have come under attack on grounds that
their newsgathering practices were impermissi-
ble.8 5 The difference is that Wilson, Hanlon and
Lauro were decided on constitutional grounds,
whereas other rulings have been grounded in tort
and statutory jurisprudence. For example, courts
have allowed a traffic accident victim to sue a tele-
vision program for intrusion after the program
broadcast her rescue without her consent; 6 per-
mitted a supermarket company to recover dam-
ages for "breach of duty of loyalty" and trespass
after reporters working undercover took jobs in
one of its stores and secretly filmed unsanitary
conditions; 7 allowed a psychic hotline employee
to sue a TV news program after a reporter took a
job as a "psychic" and secretly taped conversations
on the premises of the psychic telemarketing busi-
ness;"" and upheld a California statute that blocks
access to police records by companies that seek
the information for commercial purposes.8 9
Collectively, the body of constitutional privacy
law from Griswold to Hanlon represents a form of
privacy that shields individuals from unwanted
governmental incursions into the most deeply
personal and intimate areas of people's lives. In
the period between Griswold and Hanlon, the Su-
preme Court also recognized that constitutional
protections extend beyond personal and behav-
ioral privacy into so-called information privacy.
This form of constitutional privacy presents a new
and special problem for the ability of the press to
sanitary food-handling practices); Sanders v. American
Broad. Cos., Inc., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (holding that a
plaintiff can sue a news program for intrusion for using a
hidden camera that taped the inside of a psychic telemarket-
ing business under news media investigation); Shulman v.
Group W Productions, 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998) (holding
that an auto accident victim can bring a claim for intrusion
against a TV program that filmed her rescue without her con-
sent). For a comprehensive account of these and other cases
that deal with privacy issues and media, see CLAY CALVERT,
VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN MODERN
CULTURE (2000).
86 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 475.
87 Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 510.
88 Sanders, 978 P.2d at 69.
89 L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp.,
528 U.S. 32, 34-36 (1999).
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gather information and for the general public -
including special-interest groups, researchers,
scholars, businesses and attorneys - to seek access
to government-held information. As Part III will
show, information privacy can be raised as a con-
stitutional bar to deny public access to govern-
ment-held records that otherwise would be dis-
closable under statutory open-records lawsY0
III. SHIELDING PERSONAL INFORMATION
FROM DISCLOSURE
A. The Court Recognizes a Second Stream of
Privacy
The Supreme Court first recognized a constitu-
tionally protected right of information privacy in
197791 when it decided Whalen v. Roe 2 and Nixon
v. Administrator of General Services.9' In these two
cases, the Court declared that the constitutional
right to privacy, which could be outweighed by
the public interest in disclosure, applied not only
to individual autonomy in intimately personal
matters, but also to the individual's interest in
avoiding disclosure of highly personal informa-
tion.
9 4
In Whalen, the Supreme Court considered a
challenge to a New York statute, which required
that doctors and pharmacies provide the state
with forms pertaining to prescriptions of legal, yet
dangerous drugs. 95 Under the law, the identifying
information on these forms, including the names
and addresses of patients, doctors and pharma-
cists, would be entered in a centralized computer
database.96 The legislature passed this statute due
to concerns that these drugs were being "diverted
into unlawful channels."9 7 The law was intended
to prevent individuals from stealing or revising
prescriptions; to prevent unscrupulous pharma-
cists from filling prescriptions unlawfully; and to
90 See, e.g., Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055
(6th Cir. 1998).
91 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCI-
PLES AND POLICIES 826 (2d ed. 2002). FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 62-63 (1997).
92 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
93 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
94 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Nixon v.
Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 532-33 (1977).
95 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04.
96 Id. at 591.
97 Id. at 591-92.
98 Id. at 592.
99 Id. at 595-96.
prevent doctors from authorizing excessive or
multiple prescriptions.9" The law was challenged
on privacy grounds by a group of patients and
prescribing doctors who argued that the law in-
fringed on doctor-patient confidentiality and vio-
lated one of the constitutionally protected "zones
of privacy."99 The challengers argued that individ-
uals have a right to avoid disclosure of personal
matters. 100
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unani-
mous Court in Whalen,"" explicitly identified two
different forms of constitutional privacy inter-
ests.' 0 2 Until Whalen, the Court had recognized
only the form of personal and behavioral constitu-
tional privacy that derived from the Griswold and
Wade line of cases. 10 3 Stevens said the constitu-
tional right of privacy also recognizes information
privacy, or the "individual's [privacy] interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters. °1 0 4 He
wrote:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in
the accumulation of vast amounts of personal informa-
tion in computerized data banks or other massive gov-
ernment files. The collection of taxes, the distribution
of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision
of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces,
and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require
the orderly preservation of great quantities of informa-
tion, much of which is personal in character and poten-
tially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed.10 5
The Court, however, rejected the privacy argu-
ment, noting that the state had an important in-
terest in tracking the use of potentially dangerous
prescription drugs that had a history of abuse.'
0 6
Additionally, the state had taken security precau-
tions and provided procedural safeguards to keep
the database information from being deliberately
or unintentionally disclosed.' '° 7 Nonetheless,
Whalen remains the principal decision concerning
constitutional protection of information pri-
vacy. I0 8 The Whalen Court's recognition of consti-
I00 Id. at 598-99.
"'I Justices William J. Brennan and Potter Stewart wrote
concurring opinions. Id. at 606-07.
102 Id. at 599-600. See also TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1302.
103 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
104 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.
105 Id. at 605.
I06 Id. at 602.
17 Id. at 600.
18 Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th
Cir. 1998).
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tutionally protected information privacy has been
followed by the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and
Ninth Circuits. 109 In these cases, which involved
disclosure of personnel information,"" medical
records1" and financial information, 1 2 courts
recognized that individuals have a constitutionally
protected right of privacy (which must be
weighed against the state's interest) not to have
personal information disclosed. For example, the
Sixth Circuit, relying on Whalen, said "[P]rivacy
cases have developed along two distinct lines. The
first line of cases involves the individual's interest
in independent decision making in important life-
shaping matters, while the second line of cases
recognizes the individual's interest in avoiding
disclosure of highly personal matters."
'"13
Likewise, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Ser-
vices, 14 the Court also discussed the privacy inter-
est in nondisclosure of personal information
when it acknowledged the personal and private
nature of some of President Nixon's confidential
papers, tape recordings and other materials.' '5
Nixon brought the suit to challenge the constitu-
tionality of a federal statute that controlled public
access to presidential papers. 1 6 He was required
under the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act ("the Act"),' 1 1 7 which was signed
into law by President Ford after Nixon resigned,
to submit his personal papers and recordings to
the Administrator of General Services so the
materials could be processed and screened to de-
termine which ones would be subject to public ac-
cess and which were personal and private and
109 See id.; Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. 72 F.3d
1133 (3d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 941
F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1991); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d
1554 (2d Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638
F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); Schacter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35 (2d
Cir. 1978); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).
110 See generally Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d
1055 (6th Cir. 1998).
111 See generally Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.,
72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Attorney Gen. of the
U.S., 941 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); Schacter v. Whalen, 581
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978).
112 See generally Barry v. City of N.Y., 712 F.2d 1554 (2d
Cir. 1983); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).
113 Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1060 (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at
598-600). Kallstrom is an important case in this analysis, and it
will be discussed in detail later in the text. In Kallstrom, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals cited Whalen when it held that
a constitutional right of information privacy can trump the
disclosure requirements in Ohio's open records law. Id. at
1061-63.
would be returned."" Nixon argued he could
withhold the materials under executive privilege
and that the Act was a constitutional violation of
the separation of powers." 9 As the Court did in
Whalen, the Nixon Court recognized informational
privacy in nondisclosure of personal informa-
tion. 12 1 However, the Court ruled seven-to-two
against Nixon. In an opinion written by Justice
WilliamJ. Brennan, the Court held that under the
circumstances in that particular case, informa-
tional privacy rights did not apply because of
Nixon's public-figure status and the high public
interest in Nixon's materials.121
Although the Court did not recognize informa-
tion privacy until Whalen, the history of this
stream of privacy can be traced to issues that came
before the Court several times before and after
Whalen and Nixon were decided. 22 In a 1967 wire-
tapping case, the Court recognized a privacy inter-
est in an individual's telephone conversation, de-
claring that the Fourth Amendment extends be-
yond "tangible items."123 In Katz v. United States,
124
one of the earliest informational privacy cases,
Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the Court, clari-
fied the privacy interest in the Fourth Amend-
ment by declaring that it "protects people, not
places."' 125 However, in this case about an FBI
wiretap of a national illegal-gambling operation,
the seven-to-one majority stopped short of estab-
lishing a general right to information privacy.
26
Nearly a decade later, the Court specifically de-
clined to expand privacy protection beyond those
areas recognized in the Griswold line of cases.'
27
114 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
115 Id. at 457 (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599).
116 Id. at 430.
117 Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation
Act, Pub. L. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695-1698, §101-106 (Dec. 19,
1974).
118 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 429.
1 19 Id. at 439-41.
120 Id. at 457.
121 Id. at 465.
122 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n., 514 U.S.
334 (1995); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967). See also Matthew D. Bunker et al., Access to Govern-
ment-Held Information in the Computer Age: Applying Legal Doc-
trine to Emerging Technology, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. Rhv. 543, 587
(1993) [hereinafter Bunker].
123 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
124 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
125 Id. at 351.
126 See Bunker, supra note 122.
127 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
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In Paul v. Davis,12 8 a shoplifting suspect asserted
that police violated his constitutional rights when
police included his photo and name on a flyer of
"active shoplifters.' 2 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the five-to-three majority, noted that in
Griswold and its progeny, the Court found "limita-
tions on the States' power to substantively regu-
late conduct."' 30 However, the Court concluded
that the shoplifting suspect's privacy claim, con-
tending that the state may not publicize a record
of an official act such as an arrest, was "far afield
from this line of decisions... and we decline to
enlarge them in this manner." 131
In the same year that the Court decided Paul,
the Court voted seven-to-two to reverse a Fifth Cir-
cuit decision that held that an individual's bank
records could not be subpoenaed. - 2 The Fifth
Circuit reasoned that the documents fell within a
constitutionally protected zone of privacy.13 3 The
respondent, who was tried for running a moon-
shine-whiskey still, was convicted, in part, on the
basis of his subpoenaed bank records. The Fifth
Circuit relied on the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" rationale argued in Katz.134 Justice Pow-
ell, writing for the Court and reversing the court
of appeals, rejected the bootlegger's reasonable
expectation of privacy claim.1 35 The Court side-
stepped the question of whether the bootlegger
had a right of information privacy, declaring that
the records were not confidential communica-
tions at all, but rather were negotiable instru-
ments used in commercial transactions, which
were voluntarily submitted to the bank and ex-
posed to bank employees in the ordinary course
of business. 1
36
Almost two decades after the Whalen and Nixon
decisions, the Court held that the First Amend-
ment protected the right of anonymity for the au-
thor of a political pamphlet. 137 In a 1995 opinion
128 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
129 Id. at 694-95.
130 Id. at 713.
131 Id.
132 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
133 Id. at 437.
134 Id. at 442.
'35 Id.
136 Id.
137 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S.
334 (1995).
138 See id. at 357.
139 See id. at 340.
140 Id. at 341-42 (emphasis added).
141 Id. at 357.
that struck down as unconstitutional an Ohio stat-
ute that prohibited distribution of anonymous
campaign literature, the Court found an implicit
and constitutionally protected right of privacy in
political communications.1 38 In McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission, the state argued that the stat-
ute served a state interest by providing a means to
identify persons responsible for fraud and libel. 13 9
In a seven-to-two opinion written by Justice John
Paul Stevens, the Court stated, "The decision in
favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of
economic or official retaliation, by concern about
social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as
much of one's privacy as possible."'140 As such, the pri-
vacy afforded by anonymity in political communi-
cations "exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill
of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particu-
lar: to protect unpopular individuals from retalia-
tion - and their ideas from suppression - at the
hand of an intolerant society."'
14 1
The right of information privacy emerged again
in 1998, clashing this time with the right of public
and press access to government-held information.
The Sixth Circuit held that an individual's right of
nondisclosure of private information also means
that private information contained in a govern-
ment record may be withheld, despite the fact
that the record would otherwise be disclosable
under a state open-records law.
142
B. Information Privacy Clashes with Public
Access
Philosophers, legal scholars and other com-
mentators have written extensively about the close
relationship between public access to govern-
ment-held information and democracy.143 Alexan-
der Meiklejohn, a philosopher and educator who
was a leading figure in the modern development
142 See Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th
Cir. 1998).
143 See generallyJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971);
KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1971);
HAROLD C. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW (1953)
[hereinafter CROSS]; ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) [hereinafter
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH]. See also Vincent Blasi, The Check-
ing Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J.
523, 554-67 (1977); Thomas 1. Emerson; Legal Foundations of
the Right to Know, WASH. U. L. Q. 1 (1976); Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT.
REV. 245, 257 (1961) [hereinafter Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment].
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of democratic political theory and the First
Amendment, 144 wrote that for people to be their
own rulers, it is essential that "whatever truth may
become available shall be placed at the disposal of
all the citizens of the community."'14 5 Professor
Meiklejohn believed "[p]ublic discussions of pub-
lic issues, together with the spreading of informa-
tion and opinion bearing on those issues, must
have a freedom unabridged by our agents.'
14 6
However, unlike the First Amendment right to
publish lawfully obtained information, particu-
larly information pertaining to governmental and
public affairs, 147 the Court has refused to recog-
nize any superior constitutional rights for the
144 See Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, An Informing
Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REv
483, 503 (1980) ("The conception of democracy apparently
embraced by proponents of the 'right to know' echoes the
view of Alexander Meiklejohn, whose insights into the rele-
vance of self-government to [F]irst [Almendment analysis
have been of seminal importance."); Thomas I. Emerson, Le-
gal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 4
("It has been suggested that the right to know be adopted as
the sole, or at least the principal, basis for the constitutional
protection afforded by the [F]irst [A] mendment. Alexander
Meiklejohn is the primary source of this theory.").
145 MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 143, at 88.
146 See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment, supra note 143,
at 257.
147 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
913 (1982) ("[S]peech concerning public affairs is more
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.")
(quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964));
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) ("The maintenance
of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and
that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportu-
nity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional system.") (quoting Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)); Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist about
interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amend-
ment was to protect the free discussion of governmental af-
fairs."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964) (There is a "profound national commitment" to the
principle that "debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open."); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection given speech and
press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people.").
148 See generally Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978);
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington
Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974). In a series of cases during the
1980s, the Supreme Court held that the general public has a
qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal court
proceedings and records. See generally Richmond Newspapers
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Press-Enterprise v. Superior
Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Press-Enterprise v. Superior
Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). But even this presumed that the
press to gather news or for the public or press to
gain access to government-held information or
operations, regardless of public-interest value.
14
In order to provide for such public access, Con-
gress 149 and the legislatures in all fifty states
150
have enacted freedom of information statutes,
which, to varying degrees, open government
records to public inspection. The Freedom of In-
formation Act ("FOIA") is the federal records-dis-
closure statute. 51 The FOIA requires that federal
executive branch agencies provide any person ac-
cess to all records, unless the records fall under
any one of the nine statutory exemptions. 152 Con-
gress created the exemptions to balance the social
First Amendment right of access to criminal court proceed-
ings and records is a qualified one and does not automati-
cally stop all court closures. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982). "The presumption
[of a public trial] may be overcome only by an overriding
interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."
Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510.
149 See 5 U.S.C. §552 (2000).
150 See, e.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE §§6250-68 (West 1995);
COLO. REv. STAT. §24-72-203 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. §1-
212 (1998); D.C. CODE ANN. §§2-531 to -539 (2002); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§119.01 to .15 (West 2002); IND. CODE. ANN. §§5-
14-3-1 to -10 (Michie 2001); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§61-810 to
850 (Michie 1993); Mo. REv. STAT. §610.010 to .030 (West
2000); NEB. REv. STAT. §§84-712.01 to .09 (1999); N.Y. PUB.
OFF. LAw §§84-90 (McKinney 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§132-1
to -10 (2001); N.D. CONST. art. XI, §6; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
51, §§24A.1 to .19 (West 2000); OR. REv. STAT. §§192.410 to
.505 (2001); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§66.1 to .4 (West
2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§315-320 (1995); Wvo. STAT.
ANN. §§16-4-201 to -205 (Michie 2001).
151 5 U.S.C. §552 (2000). The federal government first
attempted legislation to provide for access to federal records
in 1946 when it enacted Section 3 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. §1002 (1946) (original version at ch.
324, §3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946)) (revised by 5 U.S.C. §552
(1966)). However, that legislation was full of gaping loop-
holes that enabled government agencies to use it as a with-
holding statute. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973); H.
REp. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at §3 (1966) (stating that
"[flor more than 10 years, through the administrations of
both political parties, case after case of improper withholding
based upon [the APA] has been documented. The Adminis-
trative Procedure Act provides no adequate remedy to mem-
bers of the public to force disclosures in such cases."). In
1966, as a response to the flawed APA disclosure section,
Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act, which
opened to public inspection the records of the executive
branch administrative agencies.
152 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1)-(9) (2000). The FOIA does not
apply to matters that fall under the categories of: (1) classi-
fied information and national security; (2) internal agency
personnel information; (3) information exempted by stat-
utes; (4) trade secrets and other confidential business infor-
mation; (5) agency memoranda; (6) disclosures that invade
personal privacy; (7) law enforcement investigation records;
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and democratic value of the public's statutory
right to know against the government's need to
keep some information secret. 153 Two of those ex-
emptions concern privacy.' 54 All the states have
analogous open-records statutes, many of which
are modeled after the FOIA. 15 5 Similarly, state
statutes have some form of exemption that allows
withholding of a record if its disclosure would
pose an invasion of privacy.
156
Conflicts commonly arise when the need of
some citizens to obtain government-held informa-
tion results in the disclosure of private informa-
tion of other citizens.' 57 Typically, courts decide
legal challenges to requests for government
records by weighing the democratic value of ac-
cess to the information against the individual
(8) reports from regulated financial institutions; and (9) geo-
logical and geophysical information. Id.
153 At the same time that a broad philosophy of "free-
dom of information" is enacted into law, it is necessary to
protect certain equally important rights of privacy with re-
spect to certain information in government files, such as
medical and personnel records. It is also necessary for the
very operation of our government to allow it to keep confi-
dential certain material, such as the investigatory files of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, 38
(1974). The FOIA Source Book of the Subcommittee on Ad-
ministrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, is a primary source for the legislative
history of the FOIA.
154 Exemption 6 permits the withholding of "personnel
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy." 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (2000). Exemption 7(C) per-
mits the withholding of "records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes," if their disclosure "could reason-
ably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C) (2000).
155 State statutes providing for public access to govern-
ment records were enacted as early as 1849, when the Wis-
consin legislature passed a public records law. See Public In-
spection of State and Municipal Executive Documents: "Eveiybody,
Practically Everything, Anytime, Except .... ", 45 FORDIlAM L.
REv. 1105, 1105 (1977). Only about a dozen states enacted
statutes that controlled access to public records before 1940,
but those laws were brief in length and lacked clear guide-
lines. Id. at 1107. By 1950, at least 11 states had already en-
acted limited open-records statutes. See CROSS, supra note
143, at 328-36.
156 See infra note 150.
157 See, e.g., Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n, 519
U.S. 355 (1997) (rejecting on privacy grounds an environ-
mental group's FOIA request for contact information of indi-
viduals who received a Bureau of Land Management newslet-
ter about the future of the Oregon High Desert); U.S. Dep't
of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487
(1994) (rejecting on privacy grounds a FOIA request by un-
ions for home addresses of federal employees for the pur-
value of privacy. ' 5  This calculus for determining
whether a record should be released was signifi-
cantly altered by the Sixth Circuit in a dispute
over an Ohio public records law that said police
personnel files qualified as disclosable records.1
59
The Sixth Circuit, relying on Whalen and Nixon as
precedent, held that the records were shielded
from access on the basis of information privacy. 160
In Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, three under-
cover officers sought damages from the City of
Columbus when the city released copies of the of-
ficers' personnel files to a defense attorney during
a criminal trial. 16 1 The city said the records fell
under the disclosure requirements of the Ohio
Public Records Act.'16 2 The officers argued that re-
leasing the files violated the officers' rights to in-
poses of contacting them about union membership); Dep't
ofJustice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749 (1989) (rejecting a journalist's FOIA request for a
FBI rap sheet of a reputed crime figure suspected of bribing
a congressman to obtain a federal contract, on grounds that
releasing the information would be an invasion of privacy be-
cause the rap sheet would not shed any light on official
agency operations or activities); Fed. Bureau of Investigation
v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615 (1982) (rejecting a journalist's
FOIA request for FBI reports requested by President Nixon,
who ordered FBI background checks on his political ene-
mies, on grounds that information originally compiled for
law-enforcement purposes does not lose its privacy-exemp-
tion status merely because the information is reproduced in a
new document that is not for law-enforcement purposes);
Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982)
(rejecting a FOIA request by The Washington Post for passport
application information on two Iranian nationals who trav-
eled under the protection of U.S. passports during a period
of strained relations between Iran and the United States);
Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976) (uphold-
ing a FOIA request by law review editors for summaries of
honor and ethics violations at the U.S. Air Force Academy).
5 8 This balancing method was established in 1976, when
the Supreme Court first considered a privacy challenge to a
request for a record under the Freedom of Information Act,
which is also a model for many state open-records laws. See
Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, said that when a privacy chal-
lenge seeks to block disclosure under FOIA, a balancing test
between the individual value of personal privacy against the
social value of public disclosure should be the device to de-
termine whether a record should be released. The Court said
the Act's privacy exemptions are limited, and they must be
narrowly construed. ]d. at 361. The opinion emphasized that
the exemptions' existence should not "obscure the basic pol-
icy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant object of the
Act." Id.
159 Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th
Cir. 1998).
16( [i.
I6 Id. at 1059.
162 Oiuio REV. CODE §149.43 (2001).
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formation privacy under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 163 After the officers sued, several Ohio
newspapers and broadcasters also requested the
officers' files, but the city refused to release the
records while the case was pending. 1 64 The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
denied the officers' motion for a preliminary in-
junction, and the officers appealed.' 65 The Sixth
Circuit, explicitly following Whalen, reversed and
held that information privacy can impose restric-
tions on the state open-records law.
166
The facts in the case go back to an investigation
by the undercover officers into drug dealing by a
notorious and violent gang in Columbus. 167 In all,
the city prosecuted 41 gang members, and the
three officers testified at a trial for eight of the
defendants.' 68 One of the defense lawyers re-
quested and received the personnel file of under-
cover officer Melissa Kallstrom, and the lawyer al-
lowed a defendant to review the file during the
trial.' 69 Personnel files typically include officers'
addresses, phone numbers, other identifying in-
formation, contact information on family mem-
bers, bank account information and other private
materials. 1 70 Her fellow undercover officers,
Thomas Coelho and Gary Householder, believed
the lawyer also obtained their files. 171 In addition,
Coelho's file was released to Police Officers for
Equal Rights, an organization that was investigat-
ing "possible discriminatory hiring and promo-
tion practices by the city." 172
The officers sued the city for invasion of privacy
under a civil rights section of the United States
Code. 173 The officers sought damages and an in-
junction barring further release of the files.' 74
The city argued that it released the files to the de-
163 Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1059.
164 Several news media outlets later joined the suit as in-
tervenors. They included "The Columbus Dispatch, The Cleve-
land Plain Dealer, The Cincinnati Post, The Akron Beacon jour-
nal, The Toledo Blade, The Youngstown Vindicator, The Canton
Repository... Cincinnati television station WCPO, and Cleve-
land television station WEWS; and, the Ohio Newspaper As-
sociation." Kallstrom, 165 F. Supp. 2d 689 n.2 (S.D. Ohio
2001).
165 Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1060.
166 Id. at 1060-61, 1069-70.






173 Id. at 1060. See also 42 U.S.C. §§1983 & 1988 (1994).
fense lawyer and to the police organization after
determining the personnel files did not fall under
any of the exemptions to the Ohio Public Records
Act.175 Additionally, the city had redacted most of
the personal identifying information from the
copies it released. 176 The U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio denied the officers'
motion for a preliminary injunction and ruled for
the city.177 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed
the district court's decision and remanded the
case for retrial. Citing Whalen, the appeals court
declared that privacy law has developed along two
distinct lines. The first concerns independent de-
cision-making over deeply personal matters and
behavior. The second recognizes an individual's
right to avoid disclosure about personal informa-
tion. 1
78
Writing the opinion for the Sixth Circuit panel,
Judge Karen Nelson Moore found that when the
release of private information "places an individ-
ual at substantial risk of serious bodily harm, pos-
sibly even death," the governmental action is sub-
ject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment and will be upheld only in instances
when the government demonstrates "a compel-
ling state interest, and [the action] is narrowly
drawn to further that state interest.1 79 The court
held that release of the officers' addresses, phone
numbers and other personal information along
with identifying information of family members
could place the officers or their family members
in a zone of danger. 180 Thus, the Sixth Circuit
ruled that prior notice must be given in all future
instances when police files are requested. This
holding placed a condition on disclosure that is
not in the Ohio law. I8' The appeals court said the
Section 1983 provides for civil liability if a person acting
under color of state law deprives another of the "rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
42 U.S.C. §1983 (2000).
174 Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1059.
175 See id. at 1064-65.
176 Kallstrom, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 700. Neither the district
court nor circuit court opinions explain why it was not em-
phasized during the first trial that the city had redacted most
of the personal identifying information contained in the of-
ficers' files. See infra note 186.
177 Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1060.
178 Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1060-61 (citing Whalen, 429 U.S.
at 598-600; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457).
179 Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1064.
180 Id. at 1067.
181 Id. at 1068-69.
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purpose of requiring prior notice is to allow per-
sons who are the subjects of the records opportu-
nities to ask for an injunction to block disclo-
sure. 182 Significantly, the Sixth Circuit never con-
sidered the fact that the city had redacted the ob-
jectionable personal and identifying information
in the officers' files before it disclosed copies of
the files. 183
On remand, a reluctant district court panel
held in September 2001 that, pursuant to the
Sixth Circuit decision, prior notice must be given
to police officers before the disclosure of their
personnel files to a member of the public. 184 The
district court clearly signaled its concern over the
Sixth Circuit's decision by beginning its own opin-
ion with a quotation from Thomas Jefferson, stat-
ing "Our liberty depends on the freedom of the
press, and that cannot be limited without being
lost."'18 5 Acknowledging that a number of Ohio
newspapers and broadcasters also requested ac-
cess to the officers' files, 18 6 the district court
framed the issue as one implicating press rights:
In this case, the court is being asked to limit the free-
dom of the press by preventing the news media from
obtaining public information containedin the city's
personnel files. City police officers fear its publication
may endanger themselves and their families. To deny
members of the press access to public information
solely because they have the ability to disseminate it
would silence the most important critics of governmen-
tal activity.' 
8 7
Complying with the Sixth Circuit's ruling, the dis-
trict court rejected the arguments of the news me-
dia that the court of appeals was wrong in recog-
nizing the federal nondisclosure privacy right,
stating, "Establishing new law for the Sixth Cir-
cuit, the panel held the Officers had a constitu-
tionally protected privacy right in the information
contained in their personnel files, 'specifically
182 Id. at 1067-69.
183 On remand, the district court denied the plaintiffs'
request for damages because the specific personal identifying
information, which may have placed them in a zone of dan-
ger, was not disclosed. Kallstrom, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 695
(holding that the fact that plaintiffs failed to provide evi-
dence that release of the information in their personnel files
would place them at risk for serious bodily harm or threat
thereof, was "fatal to their claims. By not identifying any real
potential danger that could arise from the release of informa-
tion in their personnel files, plaintiffs have failed to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to their case for which they carry a burden.").
184 Id. at 703.
185 Id. at 688.
186 Id. at 689. See also infra note 164.
187 Kallstrom, 165 F. Stipp. 2d at 688.
their interest in preserving their lives and the lives
of their family members, as well as preserving
their personal security and bodily integrity."" 8
The Court in Whalen and Nixon seemed to ex-
pand the original definition of constitutional pri-
vacy as articulated in the Griswold-Roe line. But, it
is noteworthy that the Court's recognition of in-
formation privacy was not essential in either of
those holdings. Although the Whalen Court recog-
nized the individual's right of nondisclosure of
personal information, the Court held that the stat-
ute in question did not "pose a sufficiently griev-
ous threat to either [privacy] interest to establish
a constitutional violation."' 89 After the decisions
were handed down, privacy scholar Don R.
Pember observed, "The question remains whether
recognition of this disclosure interest is an indica-
tion of a new basis for constitutional privacy or
merely tantalizing dictum that could be ignored
when the issue is placed squarely before the
Court."191'
An individual's interest in avoiding disclosure
of private information and the concept of consti-
tutionally protected information privacy were
raised before the Supreme Court in a 2001 clash
between the First Amendment right of freedom of
the press and the First Amendment right of pri-
vate speech.' 9 1
IV. EXPANDING INFORMATION PRIVACY:
BAR TNICKI v. VOPPER
A. The Latest Development: First Amendment
Protection for Private Facts
In the first Supreme Court decision in a decade
involving press content, 192 a six-to-three Court
188 Id. at 690 (quoting Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1062). The
district court noted the Sixth Circuit's Kalstrom decision
"strikingly" changed the law of the Circuit. Id. at 690 n.5.
18 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600.
190 Pember, supra note 4, at 1175.
191 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
192 Until Bartnicki, the Court had not decided a press
content case since 1991. See Masson v. The New Yorker, Inc.,
501 U.S. 496 (1991); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S.
663 (1991). During the decade between the 1991 Masson and
Cohen decisions and the 2001 Barinicki decision, the courts
were defining the First Amendment in other areas, such as in
economic regulations and in content-based versus content-
neutral messages. See, e.g., Playboy Entm't Group, Inc. v. U.S.,
30 F. Supp. 2d 702 (1998); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520
U.S. 180 (1997); Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d
105 (1995).
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majority ruled that the First Amendment pro-
tected a Pennsylvania radio station from liability
and punishment for broadcasting a secretly taped
cell phone conversation between two teachers
union representatives. 19 3 The ruling in Bartnicki v.
Vapper'9 4 represents a free press victory, but a very
limited one. The Court repeatedly emphasized
the decision was narrowly drawn and limited to
only the facts presented in that case. 19 5 However,
Bartnicki's significance extends beyond its narrow
ruling. According to First Amendment attorney
James C. Goodale, former counsel to The New York
Times, this opinion, which recognizes a First
Amendment right of private speech, also marks
the first time the Supreme Court has found a con-
stitutional right of information privacy in truthful
private facts in a press context.196 Although Bart-
nicki recognizes constitutional protection for pri-
vate facts, it differs notably from the aforemen-
tioned privacy cases because the Bartnicki ques-
tions do not pertain to state action. Rather, Bart-
nicki focuses on third-party incursions and statu-
tory privacy violations by the news media.
The events that triggered the Bartnicki suit be-
gan in May 1993 when an unknown person inter-
cepted and taped a conversation between
Anthony F. Kane, a Wilkes-Barre area school
teacher and union president, and Gloria Bart-
193 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525.
194 Id. at 514.
195 Id. at 524-25, 528-29.
196 Id. at 517, 527-28. See James C. Goodale, Bartnicki:
Publish News That's Private But True?, NEW YORK L. J., Aug. 3,
2001, at 3 [hereinafter Goodale].
197 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518-19.
198 Id. Bartnicki was one of three wiretap cases appealed
to the Court, but it was the only one decided by the Court.
The Court denied certiorari to Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221
F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1051 (2001).
See infra note 275 for an explanation of Peavy. Although the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to Boehner v. McDermott, 191
F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the Court vacated the judgment
and remanded Boehner to the D.C. Circuit Court for a rehear-
ing "for further consideration in light of" Bartnicki. McDer-
mott v. Boehner, 532 U.S. 1050, 1050 (2001) (vacated). The
D.C. District Court was expected to hear the case in late 2002
or early 2003. Boehner concerned a suit brought by Ohio Re-
publican Congressman John A. Boehner against Washington
Democratic Congressman James A. McDermott. The suit was
over a conference-call between Boehner and three other
prominent Republican leaders: Dick Armey, Tom DeLay and
Newt Gingrich. The call, which took place in December
1996, was intercepted on a scanner and taped as Boehner was
driving through Florida. At the time, Gingrich was under in-
vestigation by the House Ethics Committee, and the conver-
sation focused on a strategy to soften the public impact of the
investigation. Boehner, 191 F.3d at 465. The conversation was
nicki, the union's chief negotiator. It was a time of
contentious contract negotiations, and they dis-
cussed whether the teachers would receive the
raise offered by the Wyoming Valley West School
District or the raise proposed by the teachers
union.1 97 Kane was taped as saying, "If they're not
going to move for three percent, we're gonna
have to go to their homes .. . to blow off their
front porches. We'll have to do some work on
some of those guys."' 98
The tape mysteriously ended up in the mail-box
of Jack Yocum, the head of a local taxpayers' or-
ganization, who disagreed with the union's de-
mands during contract negotiations. 99 Yocum
said he played the tape and recognized the voices
of Bartnicki and Kane. He then gave it to Wilkes-
Barre WILK Radio talk show host Fred Williams
(whose actual name is Frederick W. Vopper). Wil-
liams-Vopper, a vocal critic of the teachers' union,
repeatedly played the tape on the air in the Fall of
1993 after the school district and teachers union
accepted an arbitration proposal that was gener-
ally favorable to the teachers.
200
Bartnicki and Kane brought suit against the ra-
dio station for playing the tape. They sought ac-
tual damages and punitive damages under federal
and state wiretapping laws. 20 1 They based their
federal claims on the Electronic Communications
taped by a Florida couple, who forwarded the tape to McDer-
mott, the ranking Democrat on the House Ethics Committee,
on January 8, 1997. Id. "The next day, McDermott gave cop-
ies of the tape to the New York Times, the Atlanta Journal-Con-
stitution and Roll-Call." Id. Each newspaper ran a story on the
conversation. Three days later, McDermott gave copies of the
tape to fellow committee members, and then he resigned
from the committee. The Florida couple publicly confessed
to taping the conversation and giving a copy to McDermott.
Id. They were prosecuted under the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act and were fined $1,000. See 18 U.S.C. §§2511,
2520 (2000). Boehner sued McDermott for $10,000 in statu-
tory damages under the Act, claiming that McDermott had
illegally disclosed the contents of the conference call with the
knowledge that it was illegally intercepted. Id. at 466. The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act says the act of wire-
tapping is unlawful, and it is also unlawful to disclose con-
tents of an unlawfully taped communication. 18 U.S.C.
§2511 (1) (c) (2000).
199 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519.
200 Id.
201 See id. See also 28 U.S.C. §2510 (2000); 18 PA. C.S.A.
§5701 (1980). Federal law has prohibited disclosures of ille-
gally intercepted telephone conversations since the Commu-
nications Act of 1934. See 47 U.S.C. §151 (2000). See also Nar-
done v. U.S., 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (holding that an illegally
intercepted telephone conversation was "a fruit of a poison-
ous tree"); Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the
attachment of a recording device to a phone booth consti-
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Privacy Act of 1986202 and their state claims on
the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Sur-
veillance Control Act.2 0 3 The laws apply not only
to any person who intercepts phone conversa-
tions, 204 but also to any person who discloses the
information knowing, or having reason to know,
that the communication was unlawfully ob-
tained. 2 15 The radio station argued that to penal-
ize disclosure would violate its right to broadcast
under the First Amendment. The station noted
that it did not participate in the unlawful taping,
that its access to the information was acquired le-
gally; and the information was of public con-
cern.
20 6
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania dismissed a motion by the radio
station for summary judgment and held that the
case should go to trial.20 7 The court reasoned that
"a violation of these acts can occur by the mere
finding that a defendant had a reason to believe
that the communication that he disclosed or used
was obtained [illegally]. "20 On appeal, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed
the judgment. In its analysis, the Third Circuit
found the wiretapping laws to be content-neutral
and applied intermediate scrutiny as the standard
of review. 200 The court of appeals concluded that
the First Amendment precludes imposition of
civil damages against the news media for disclos-
ing a taped conversation containing "information
of public significance" when the news media
"played no direct or indirect role in the unlawful
interception.,"2 10
Although the Third Circuit recognized a signifi-
cant state interest in protecting the privacy of cell
phone conversations, it held that "the govern-
tuted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment). And
in 1968 Congress observed:
Tremendous scientific and technological developments
that have taken place in the last century have made pos-
sible today the wide-spread use and abuse of electronic
surveillance techniques. As a result of these develop-
ments, privacy of communication is seriously jeopard-
ized .... No longer is it possible, in short, for each man
to retreat into his home and be left alone. Every spoken
word relating to each man's personal, marital, religious,
political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by
an unseen auditor and turned against the speaker to the
auditor's advantage.
S. REP. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 67 (1968) (Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Acts of 1968).
202 28 U.S.C. §2510 (2000).
203 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5701 (1980).
204 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(a) (2000).
205 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(c) (2000).
ment's significant interest in protecting privacy is
not sufficient [in this instance] to justify the seri-
ous burdens the damages provision of the Wire-
tapping Acts place on free speech." 211 The ap-
peals court reasoned that to apply the damages
provision to the news media would "deter the me-
dia from publishing even material that may law-
fully be disclosed under the Wiretapping Acts. '" 21
2
The appeals court said, "Reporters often will not
know the precise origins of information they re-
ceive from witnesses and other sources, nor
whether the information stems from a lawful
source."2 1 3 The Third Circuit emphasized that the
public interest in the taped conversation and the
newsworthiness of the story were important stan-
dards to be considered.
214
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority
held in a narrowly focused opinion that the radio
station was free to publish private information
under the facts presented in this case, namely that
the conversation concerned a matter of public in-
terest;2 15 the news media were not participants in
the unlawful taping;216 and the news media did
not unlawfully gain access to the tape.2 1 7 justices
William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia and Clar-
ence Thomas dissented.
The Bartnicki Court majority agreed with the
lower court that the wiretap statutes are content-
neutral laws of general applicability, but the Court
did not agree with the lower court's application of
intermediate scrutiny.2' 8 The Bartnicki Court, rely-
ing on Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 219 instead
reviewed the federal and Pennsylvania statutes
under the strict scrutiny standard of review, find-
ing,2 11 "As a general matter, 'state action to pun-
ish the publication of truthful information sel-
206 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525.
20)7 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999).
208 Id. at 115.
209 Id. at 121.
210 Id. at 112, 129.
211 Id. at 129.
212 Id. at 126-27.
213 Id. at 127.
214 Id.
215 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529, 540.
216 Id. at 525, 527-28.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 521-22, 526.
219 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
2201 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527-28 (citing Daily Mail, 443
U.S. at 103). Under the strict scrutiny standard of review the
government can only compel disclosure of information if the
government can prove its use of the information would ad-
vance a legitimate state interest, and that its action is nar-
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dom can satisfy constitutional standards. . . [I]f a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information
about a matter of public significance then state of-
ficials may not constitutionally punish publication
of the information, absent a need... of the high-
est order.' "221
The majority of six justices held that the federal
and Pennsylvania statutes' prohibitions on dissem-
inating intercepted communications did not serve
a need of the highest order.222 Writing for the
Court majority, Justice John Paul Stevens rejected
the government's two arguments: 1) that the gov-
ernment has an interest in removing incentives
for people to intercept private conversations; and
2) that the government has an interest in mini-
mizing the harm to people whose conversations
have been illegally intercepted.2 23 The Court
held that the interest in removing incentives for
the interception of private conversations would
not be served by punishing someone other than
the party who intercepted the call.22 4 In its analy-
sis of the second interest (minimizing harm),
which the Court noted was constitutionally
stronger than the first interest (removing incen-
tive), the Court acknowledged that privacy of
communication is an important value, and the
fear of public disclosure of private conversations
might well have a chilling effect on private
speech. 225 The majority concluded, however, that
under the facts in this particular case, the govern-
mental interest in protecting citizens from the
publication of their private communications -
rowly tailored to meet that legitimate interest. The Court has
said this standard should be applied in issues involving cer-
tain fundamental rights that deserve special protection. This
highest level of protection is generally applied to content-
based regulations of speech. Under this standard, the courts
presume a regulation is unconstitutional. The government
must bear the burden of proving that the regulation is closely
related to a compelling government interest and show that
the regulation achieves its intended purpose by the least re-
strictive means possible. KERMIT L. HALL, ED., THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
845 (1992) [hereinafter HALL]. Under intermediate scrutiny,
a governmental regulation must pass the O'Brien test as intro-
duced in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Under this test: (1) the government regulation must be
"within the constitutional power of the government;" (2) the
regulation must further an "important or substantial govern-
mental interest;" (3) the government interest must be "unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression;" and (4) the "in-
cidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms"
must be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest." Id. at 377. See also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997). There is a third level of scru-
tiny known as ordinary or minimum scrutiny that is less rigor-
while strong enough to be an interest of the high-
est order - had to "give way when balanced
against the interest in publishing matters of public
importance."2
26
The Court noted that even Warren and Bran-
deis conceded that "[t]he right of privacy does
not prohibit any publication of matter which is of
public or general interest."227 The Bartnicki Court
thus refused to allow "a stranger's illegal con-
duct ... to remove the First Amendment shield
from speech about a matter of public concern."228 In
Justice Stevens's view, a key point was that the
taped phone conversation was of high public con-
cern. Although the statutes could possibly apply
to unlawful "disclosures of trade secrets or domes-
tic gossip or other information of purely private
concern,' 229 the Court reserved this question. Ste-
vens said privacy interests do not bar publication
of information of public interest.230 The Court
found that the disclosed conversation between
the two teachers' union representatives was "un-
questionably a matter of public concern."
2 31
In reaching its conclusion, the Court made a
significant finding. Stevens, who also wrote the
Whalen v. Roe232 opinion twenty-four years earlier,
said the right of individual privacy and the right
to publish information concerning public issues
are deserving of equal constitutional protection
and, therefore, "present a conflict between inter-
ests of the highest order - on the one hand, the
interest in the full and free dissemination of infor-
mation concerning public issues, and, on the
ous. Under ordinary scrutiny, courts presume the regulation
is constitutional, and the plaintiff challenging the regulation
must prove the offending regulation or action is unconstitu-
tional. The government is required to show only that the reg-
ulation or action is "reasonably" related to a "legitimate" gov-
ernment interest and only incidentally affects speech. Ordi-
nary scrutiny is typically applied to social and economic regu-
lations. HALL, supra note 220, at 845.
221 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527-28 (quoting Daily Mail, 443
U.S. at 102-03) (emphasis added).
222 Id. at 531-32.
223 Id. at 529.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 32-33 (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random
House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968)).
226 Id. at 533-34 (emphasis added).
227 Id. at 534 (quoting Warren and Brandeis, supra note
23, at 214).
228 Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
229 Id. at 533.
230 Id. at 534.
231 Id. at 535.
232 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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other hand, the interest in individual privacy and,
more specifically in fostering private speech."
233
Stevens noted that the "fear of public disclosure
of private conversations might well have a chilling
effect on private speech," and, "[a]ccordingly, it
seems to us that there are important interests to




Justice Stephen G. Breyer, whose concurrence
was joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, fo-
cused more on the specific content of the dis-
closed remarks and also on the limited public fig-
ure status of the speakers themselves. 235 Breyer
emphasized that he concurred in the majority
opinion because, among other factors, the con-
versation "involved a matter of unusual public
concern, namely a threat of potential physical
harm to others."236 He said Bartnicki and Kane
had "little or no legitimate interest in maintaining
the privacy of the particular conversation" be-
cause the conversation "rais[ed] a significant con-
cern for the safety of others."231 7 Reasoning that
the speakers' "legitimate privacy expectations are
unusually low, and the public interest in defeating
those expectations is unusually high,"23s Breyer
concluded that the statutes' enforcement would
"disproportionately harm media freedom." 23 9 He
also emphasized that the majority holding was
narrow and "limited to the special circumstances
present" in this case.
2 4
1
Breyer, however, disagreed with the majority's
use of strict scrutiny as its level of review. He said
that he believed strict scrutiny is not automatically
appropriate in analyzing an issue in which one
constitutional right is pitted against another, as
was the conflict in Bartnicki.241 Instead, he sug-
gested that a more flexible balancing test is the
appropriate standard in cases like these. 242 Breyer
explicitly declined to recognize any preference
for press rights over private speech, noting that
the Court's holding "does not imply a significantly
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518.
Id. at 533.
See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539-40 (Breyer, J., concur-
Id. at 535-36 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 535 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
broader constitutional immunity for the me-
dia."243 Finally, Breyer made a point of expressing
particular concern over "the challenges future
technology may pose to the individual's interest in
basic personal privacy" and suggested that they be
more appropriately addressed by the legisla-
ture.
244
For dissenter Chief Justice Rehnquist, the facts
in Bartnicki demonstrated that technology already
threatens personal privacy and that legal curbs are
necessary to prevent such incursions. 245 In his dis-
senting opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, Rehnquist pointed out there are 49.1
million cell phones in operation in the United
States, 246 along with 20 million scanners capable
of intercepting cell phone conversations. 247 He
argued that the majority opinion "diminishes,
rather than enhances, the purposes of the First
Amendment: chilling the speech of the millions
of Americans who rely upon electronic technol-
ogy to communicate each day. ' 248 Rehnquist's dis-
sent, which favored the interests of private speech
over public speech in a First Amendment tug-of-
war, comes as no surprise. 249 His position was con-
sistent with a philosophy he has expressed at least
as far back as 1974 when he wrote, "Privacy in to-
day's lexicon is a 'good' word; that which in-
creases privacy is considered desirable, and that
which decreases it is considered undesirable. It is
a 'positive' value.."
250
Rehnquist echoed this view in his dissenting
opinion in Bartnicki when he stated, "The Court
concludes that the private conversation between
Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony Kane is somehow a
'[public] debate ... worthy of constitutional pro-
tection.'" 25 1 The Constitution, he argued, "should
not protect the involuntary broadcast of personal
conversations. Even where the communications
involve public figures or concern public matters,
the conversations are nonetheless private and
244 Id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring).
245 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541-42, 549 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
246 Id. at 554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
247 Id. at 549 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
248 Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
249 Id. at 547, 551-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
250 William H. Rehnquist, Is An Expanded Right of Privacy
Consistent With Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?, 23 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1974).
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worthy of protection. '" 252 The dissenters sharply
criticized the majority opinion for failing to ex-
plicitly define the kinds of information that would
fall under the category of matters of public con-
cern or interest.253 The dissenters also criticized
the majority for applying strict scrutiny in their
analysis.
2 54
Rehnquist would have permitted enforcement
of the wiretap statutes on the theory that punish-
ment would "dry up the market. ' 255 He argued
that enforcement would deter persons from ille-
gally intercepting communications in the same
way that prosecutions for possession of stolen
goods deters theft by drying up the market for sto-
len goods. 256 Rehnquist acknowledged that the
wiretap laws may create an incidental burden on
speech but concluded "these statutes further the
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' speech of
the private parties.
25 7
B. The Bartnicki Court Settles One Issue-But
Raises Many Questions
Although the Court majority emphasized that
the Bartnicki opinion is narrow and limited to the
facts in that particular case, the decision advances
press rights in one important way. It settles the im-
portant question of whether the press may pub-
lish information it lawfully acquired from a source
who obtained the information unlawfully.258 This
so-called "stolen goods" issue 259 was raised but not
resolved in the 1971 Pentagon Papers case.260 In
New York Times v. United States,261 the Court held
that the United States government did not meet
its heavy burden of proof under the circum-
stances in that case to halt publication of a New
York Times series that traced the history of the
United States' involvement in the Vietnam war.
262
The newspaper series was based on a 47-volume
history that was commissioned by the Department
252 Id. at 554-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
253 Id. at 554 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
254 Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
255 See id. at 550-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
256 Id. at 550 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
257 Id. at 554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
258 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 548. See also Goodale, supra note
196, at 3.
259 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 550-51 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissent-
ing).
260 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720-
21 (1971).
261 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
of Defense and came into The Times'unauthorized
possession. 263 After The Times ran the first story on
June 13, 1971, the government protested the pub-
lication of the information. The Times refused to
stop publication and the U.S. government sued,
seeking an injunction to bar further publica-
tion.
2 6 4
The U.S. government argued that the govern-
ment was entitled to an injunction halting publi-
cation of the Pentagon Papers series because the
President had power to conduct foreign affairs
and protect national security. 26 5 The government
argued further that publication would do irrepa-
rable harm to the nation and its ability to conduct
foreign affairs. 2 66 The Court said in a six-to-three
vote that an order to permanently enjoin The New
York Times from publishing the series would be a
violation of the First Amendment right of free-
dom of the press. Although each justice wrote a
separate opinion, the majority agreed in a per
curiam opinion that in a case involving the prior
restraint of a publication, the government bears a
heavy burden to justify censorship. 26 7 The Court
concluded that under the facts in this particular
case, the government failed to show why such a
restraint should be imposed on The New York
Times.268 The Court, however, did not settle the
question of whether the press may publish unlaw-
fully obtained information when the press itself
was not involved in the unlawful acquisition.
By resolving the "stolen goods" question, the
Bartnicki Court added another decision to a series
of four important privacy cases that advanced
press rights over the past quarter-century. 2 69 In
the 1975 decision of Cox Broadcasting Corporation v.
Cohn, the Court held that the news media cannot
be punished or held civilly liable for publishing
private information that exists in an official court
record available to the public.2 70 Three years
later, the Court held in Landmark v. Communica-
262 See id. at 714.
263 See id. at 759-60.
264 See id. at 714, 759-60.
265 See id. at 732.
266 See id.
267 See id. at 714.
268 See id.
269 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v.
Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Landmark Com-
munications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
270 Cox, 420 U.S. at 491. This privacy suit was brought
against an Atlanta television station by the family of a rape
and murder victim. The station, in violation of a Georgia law
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tions, Inc. v. Virginia that a newspaper cannot be
punished for printing information about a confi-
dential judicial inquiry because of the public in-
terest value in such an inquiry.27' Constitutional
protection for publishing truthful information
was extended further in 1979 in Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., when the Court asserted that if a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information
about a matter of public significance then state of-
ficials "may not constitutionally punish publica-
tion of the information, absent a need to further a
state interest. . . of the highest order."272 The
fourth important ruling was handed down in 1989
in Florida Star v. B.JF, when the Court held that
when a newspaper publishes truthful but private
information that was lawfully acquired and of
public interest "punishment may be lawfully im-
posed. . . only when narrowly tailored to a state
interest of the highest order," which was an inter-
est that was not asserted by the state in this
case.
2 7 3
Bartnicki differs from these four cases in a signif-
icant way. Each of these four cases involved publi-
cation of truthful information obtained from gov-
ernmental sources, whereas Bartnicki for the first
time considered liability for invasion of privacy in
an instance where the broadcast information
came from a nongovernmental source.274 Al-
though Bartnicki makes a contribution to press
that prohibited the identification of sexual assault victim,
named the woman after obtaining her identity from court
records. Id. at 471-74.
271 Landmark, 435 U.S. at 838. The Virginia newspaper
identified a judge under investigation by a state panel that
reviews complaints about the conduct of judges. Id. at 831.
Chief Justice Warren Burger noted in the Landmark opinion
that conduct of public officials and the publication of the
newspaper article "lies near the core of the First Amend-
ment." Id. at 838.
272 Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103
(1979). Two West Virginia newspapers identified a 14-year-
old homicide suspect after learning his name from witnesses
and law enforcement authorities. State law prohibited news-
papers from identifying juvenile offenders. Id. at 99-100.
273 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541. A Florida newspaper
identified a rape victim in violation of a state law that prohib-
ited naming sexual assault victims. A reporter lawfully ob-
tained the woman's identity from a sheriff's department
press release. Id. at 526-27.
274 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517-18.
275 See Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001). The Peavy case also
arose out of a school board dispute. A Dallas, Texas couple,
Charles and Wilma Harmon, used a police scanner in 1994
and 1995 to intercept and tape cordless-telephone conversa-
tions of a neighbor who was a Dallas Independent School
District board member who they believed was corrupt. Id. at
rights, the Court sidestepped two overarching
questions of tremendous importance. Like its
predecessor cases discussed above, Bartnicki did
not settle the issue of whether the news media can
ever be penalized for publishing truthful informa-
tion. Further, the Court again left open the corol-
lary question of whether the press has the right to
publish truthful information if the press itself was
involved in the unlawful acquisition of the infor-
mation. In other words, the Court ignored the
question of exactly what level of press involvement
may lead to culpability. In fact, the Court denied
certiorari to a separate wiretapping case that came
up for review at the same time as Bartnicki and
that posed this precise question.2 75 Historically,
the Court has stopped short of asking whether the
First Amendment protects the news media from
punishment and liability if the press itself directly
participated in unlawfully acquiring informa-
tion.2 76 In Florida Star v. B.JF, Justice Thurgood
Marshall noted:
The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue
whether, in cases where information has been acquired
unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government
may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but
the ensuing publication as well. This issue was raised
but not definitively resolved in New York Times Co. v.
United States, and reserved in Landmark Communications.
We have no occasion to address it here.
2 77
Further casting doubt as to the weight of the
164. The Harmons offered the tapes to WFAA television re-
porter Robert Riggs. Riggs was advised by the station's coun-
sel that it was lawful to accept and broadcast them. Id. The
taping of the board member, Carver Dan Peavy, continued
for several months. Id. at 165. The reporter continued ac-
cepting tapes until the station's counsel revised its opinion
and concluded that the taping was illegal under federal and
Texas wiretap statutes. Id. at 166. Three news reports were
broadcast about school board corruption involving school-
district employees' insurance programs that Peavy con-
trolled. The news reports included information obtained
from the tapes that was confirmed by other sources. The re-
ports did not include excerpts of the tapes. Id. The district
court dismissed Peavy's claims on grounds that the First
Amendment protects the use and disclosure of truthful and
lawfully obtained information. Id. at 167. However, the Fifth
Circuit reversed in part, stating that summary judgment for
the defendants was inappropriate, because the television sta-
tion defendants "participated" in the interceptions. The re-
porter had told the Harmons that he would like copies of the
tapes that were being made and asked the couple not to edit
the tapes. Id. at 171, 194. Peavy was settled out of court after
the Supreme Court handed down the Bartnicki opinion.
276 See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532-33, 541; Daily Mail, 443
U.S. at 105; Landmark, 435 U.S. at 837.
277 See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535 n.8 (citations omit-
ted).
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Bartnicki Court's affirmation of press freedom, the
Court repeatedly emphasized that the decision
was a very narrow one and limited to the particu-
lar facts of that case. 278 Stevens stressed that the
issue in Bartnicki asked only, "[If] the punished
publisher of information has obtained the infor-
mation in question in a manner lawful in itself but
from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may
the government punish the ensuing publication
of that information based on the defect in a
chain? 12 79 Echoing opinions in Florida Star and
Landmark Communications, Stevens said the Court
purposefully framed the issue narrowly in Bart-
nicki as, "Our refusal to construe the issue
presented more broadly is consistent with this
Court's repeated refusal to answer categorically
whether truthful publication may ever be pun-
ished consistent with the First Amendment."
2 s °
1
Breyer's concurrence reiterated and underscored
this view.
281
The limited focus of the Bartnicki issue and its
narrow decision means that in another similar
case, but one with slightly different circumstances,
the decision could go the other way. The Breyer-
O'Connor concurrence made clear that the news
media prevailed in this instance mainly because
the radio station was not implicated in the unlaw-
ful taping itself and because the taped conversa-
tion was of unusually high public significance -
not simply because of the newsworthiness of the
material. 28 2 The reasoning in the Breyer-
O'Connor concurring opinion strongly suggests
that they could easily cast their key votes with
Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, forming a new ma-
jority in the future. Breyer pointedly refused to
recognize any preference for press rights of pri-
vate speech.28 3 And it was O'Connor who cast one
of three dissenting votes in Florida Star, along with
Rehnquist and White, who wrote, "If the First
Amendment prohibits wholly private persons ...
278 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517, 528; Id. at 535-36, 541
(Breyer, J., concurring).
279 Id. at 528 (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d
463, 484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Sentelle,J., dissenting)).
280 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529. See also Florida Star, 491 U.S.
at 532-33; Landmark, 435 U.S. at 837.
281 See id. at 535-36, 541. (Breyer, J., concurring).
282 See id. at 535-36, 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
283 See id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
284 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 550-51 (White, J., dissenting).
285 See Goodale, supra note 196.
286 Id.
from recovering for the publication of the fact
that she was raped, I doubt that there remain any
'private facts' which persons may assume will not
be" the subject of news media reports.
28 4
Arguably, Bartnicki stands for the proposition
that a right of privacy may be grounds to punish
publication of the truth, but the case will most
likely "limit the maxim of 'publish and be
damned' in future privacy cases." 2 5 In noting
that the Bartnicki Court recognized a First Amend-
ment-based right of privacy in truthful facts, First
Amendment attorney James C. Goodale, the cur-
rent Communications Law chair of the Practicing
Law Institute and the former general counsel for
The New York Times in the Pentagon Paper Case,
wrote in the New York Law Journal:
It may come as a shock to many that the Supreme
Court has never before [Bartnicki] decided there is such
a right of privacy in the publishing context. While the
Court has recognized a right of privacy in other con-
texts such as in connection with a woman's fight to
choose and a right to be free from unreasonable
searches, the Court has never said, as far as I know,
there is a right of privacy that may penalize the publica-
tion of the truth. Writing for the majority, Justice John
Paul Stevens concludes there is such a right, on the
grounds that privacy laws foster private speech.
286
In the final analysis, Bartnicki v. Vopper advances
press rights modestly, 28 7 while also enhancing the
concept of information privacy.
288
The rise of constitutional privacy has not taken
place in a legal vacuum. Concerns about personal
privacy, fueled in great part by unprecedented
technological advances, are abundantly evident in
statutory and regulatory actions on the federal
and state levels. Besides the more than 40 bills
considered by the 107th Congress, at least a
dozen of which deal with online privacy,289 the
federal executive branch and individual states
have been taking action to protect the public and
preserve the right to be let alone.
287 The narrow focus of the Bartnicki opinion prompted
veteran New York Times Supreme Court reporter Linda
Greenhouse to write, "While the decision favored the media
defendants, it could be read as a cautionary tale for the na-
tion's newsrooms." Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court
Roundup; Court Says Press Isn't Liable for Use of ill-Gotten Tapes,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2001, at A14.
288 As Goodale observed, "While media lawyers and press
barons let out a collective sigh of relief at the decision, there
may be pain for them in the future." Goodale, supra note
196.
289 See infra note 13.
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V. CURRENT STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY TRENDS FAVOR PRIVACY
OVER OPEN GOVERNMENT
The rise of constitutionally protected informa-
tion privacy carries especially troubling implica-
tions in the current national political climate,
which is increasingly marked by governmental se-
crecy. For example, the Bush Administration has
established a new Freedom of Information Act
policy that urges the executive branch federal
agencies to use the Act's privacy exemptions 290 to
resist disclosure of agency records.291 In a memo-
randum issued on October 12, 2001, Attorney
General John Ashcroft rescinded the previous
standard set by former Attorney General Janet
Reno. The Reno FOIA policy emphasized "maxi-
mum responsible disclosure of government infor-
mation" unless "disclosure would be harmful."2 92
Ashcroft replaced Reno's foreseeable-harm stan-
dard with a test that encourages withholding
based on a "sound legal basis. ' 293 Although shifts
in FOIA policy are traditional whenever a Presi-
dent from a different party is elected, Ashcroft's
290 See5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (2000); id. §552 (b)(7)(C).
291 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, OFFICE OF IN-
FORMATION AND PRIVACY, FOIA POST, NEW ATrORNEY GENERAL
MEMORANDUM ISSUED, at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/
foiapost/2001foiapost19.htm (last visited June 4, 2002)
[hereinafter DOJ MEMO]. See also Critics Say New Rules Limits
Access to Records, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A]8.
292 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND
AGENCIES REGARDING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
(Summer/Fall 1993) (reprinted in FOIA UPDATE at 4-5). It is
important to place the Reno memorandum in a context that
reflects political realities and the independence of the execu-
tive branch federal agencies. In a 1997 report, the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press documented wide-
spread violations and abuses of the FOIA by agency officials
during the Clinton Administration. For example, it took The
Washington Post two years to obtain records detailing Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbot's expenses on a foreign trip,
and there were repeated denials of FOIA requests for infor-
mation pertaining to the White House's $25 million tele-
phone system. See Mark Tapscott & Nicole Taylor, Few Journal-
ists Use the Federal Freedom of Information Act: A Study by the
Center for Media and Public Policy, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
at http://www.heitage.org/research (last visited May 1,
2002). During Clinton's second term, agency delays and de-
nials persisted, according to a study by the Heritage Founda-
tion. See id. For example, the administration rejected a jour-
nalist's FOIA request for presidential guests at Camp David
on the grounds that the information "would not significantly
contribute to the public understanding of the operations or
activities of government." Id.
293 See DOJ MEMO, supra note 291.
294 Since the mid-1970s, the policies of Democratic ad-
ministrations have leaned more heavily toward disclosure
approach represents a significant restriction even
by Republican standards, which are typically less
FOLA-friendly than those of Democratic adminis-
trations. 29 4 For comparison, during the Reagan
Administration, Attorney General William French
Smith established a "substantial legal basis" test to
withhold records. 295 Ashcroft's "sound legal basis"
test suggests an even lower hurdle than a "substan-
tial legal basis" to justify withholding records.
296
The new Department of Justice policy has
sparked concern among journalists, legislators
and open-government advocates who fear the ad-
ministration's new direction may mark the begin-
ning of "a new era of governmental secrecy under
the guise of protecting [personal] privacy."2 97 Im-
plicit in Ashcroft's memorandum were concerns
over national security and law enforcement in the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist at-
tacks on Washington, D.C. and New York City.
Yet, the policy's focus on privacy exemptions ex-
tends beyond matters related to national security
and law enforcement. "The mere mention of a
name in a record now... can be used to deny a
and declassification of records than have Republican Admin-
istrations. A comparison of Executive Orders on declassifica-
tion issued by Presidents Carter and Reagan reflects the
sharp differences in philosophy concerning public access be-
tween the two administrations. For example, President Carter
attempted to balance the public's right to know against na-
tional security interests by creating a presumption against
classification. See Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. §190, 43
Fed. Reg. 28,949 (June 28, 1978), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. §401
app. 706-12 (Supp. IV 1980). Additionally, the Carter Admin-
istration's Department of Justice encouraged a strong policy
of restricting agency use of the Freedom of Information Act.
See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, JUSTICE SETS NEW
FOIA POLICY, FOIA UPDATE, Vol. II, No. 3 (June 1981), avail-
able at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia-updates/Vol_ l_3/
pagel.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002). After President Rea-
gan took office, he restricted public access under the FOIA,
eliminated the presumption against classification and in-
creased the duration of classifications. See Exec. Order No.
12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (Apr. 2, 1982). The Reagan Exec-
utive Order remained unchanged during the Bush Adminis-
tration. See also Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, Open
Government in the Digital Age: The Legislative History of How Con-
gress Established a Right of Public Access to Electronic Information
Held by Federal Agencies, 78 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 45,
52-53 (Spring 2001).
295 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, OFFICE OF IN-
FORMATION AND PRIVACY, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMO ON
FOIA, (reprinted in FOIA UPDATE, Vol. II, No. 3, at 3 (June
1981)) available at http://www.lsdo.gov/oip/foia-updates/
VolII_3/page3.htm (last visited July 9, 1981).'
296 See Critics Say New Rules Limits Access to Records, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A18.
297 Martin Halstuk, In Review: The Threat to Freedom of In-
formation, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 8 (Jan./Feb. 2002).
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FOIA request on the ground that it would violate
someone's privacy,"' warned Lucy Dalglish, execu-
tive director of the Reporters Committee for Free-
dom of the Press. 298 Senator Patrick Leahy of Ver-
mont criticized the new FOLA policy as "contrary
to the spirit of the FOIA, [which is] intended to
give Americans answers to questions they believe
are important, not just the information the gov-
ernment wants them to believe."
299
The use of FOIA privacy exemptions to restrict
access to agency records was already a common
practice even before the Ashcroft memorandum,
according to the Department of Justice. 300 In a
2002 analysis of recent agency annual reports,
30 1
the Department of Justice reported that the gen-
eral privacy exemption, Exemption 6,302 was the
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, OFFICE OF IN-
FORMATION AND PRIvACY, FOIA POST, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL
FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost3.htm (last visited
Aug. 5, 2002) [hereinafter DOJ SUMMARY].
301 See id.
302 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (2000). Exemption 6 states that
the FOIA does not allow disclosure of records pertaining to
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure
of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy." Id.
303 See DOJ SUMMARY, supra note 300. See also 5 U.S.C.
§552(b) (1)-(9) (2000). The FOIA does not apply to matters
that fall under the categories of: (1) classified information
and national security; (2) internal agency personnel informa-
tion; (3) information exempted by statutes; (4) trade secrets
and other confidential business information; (5) agency
memoranda; (6) disclosures that invade personal privacy; (7)
law-enforcement investigatory records; (8) reports from regu-
lated financial institutions; and (9) geological and geophysi-
cal information. Exemption 7, the law enforcement exemp-
tion, contains several subsections, one of which also allows
withholding based on privacy. See 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C)
(2000). The Exemption 7 privacy subsection states that the
FOIA does not apply to matters that are "records or informa-
tion compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such law enforcement records
or information could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Id.
304 The Court ruled in favor of disclosure only once, in
its first Exemption 6 case, Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425
U.S. 352 (1976) (upholding a FOIA request by law review edi-
tors for summaries of honor and ethics violations at the U.S.
Air Force Academy). This suit was brought by the New York
University Law Review, which sought summaries of honor and
ethics hearings conducted for United States Air Force Acad-
emy cadets who had cheated on exams. Id. at 354-55. The Air
Force argued that disclosing these records would stigmatize
the cadets for the rest of their careers. The Court ruled that
the information in the records and hearings summaries,
along with details of how the Air Force Academy handled
cheating, were of high public interest and ordered that the
records he disclosed with the names of the cadets redacted.
most commonly used of all the FOIA's nine statu-
tory exemptions.30 3 Indeed, the history of FOJA
privacy disputes that have reached the Supreme
Court over the years shows that the Department
of Justice has been extremely effective in defend-
ing agency decisions to withhold records; the
Court has heard seven FOIA privacy cases since
1976, and it ruled in favor of agency decisions to
withhold records in all but one of these cases.
30 4
In another move that fosters government se-
crecy by the Executive Branch, President George
W. Bush has issued an executive order 305 that con-
flicts with the 1978 Presidential Records Act,
30 6
which had provided that presidential papers may
be made public 12 years after a President leaves
office. 30 7 Bush's order gives the sitting President,
See id. at 367-82. In the six privacy cases that followed over the
next twenty-one years, however, the Court upheld agency de-
cisions to withhold records. See Bibles v. Oregon Natural De-
sert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355 (1997) (rejecting on privacy grounds
an environmental group's FOIA request for contact informa-
tion of individuals who received a Bureau of Land Manage-
ment newsletter about the future of the Oregon High De-
sert); U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth.,
510 U.S. 487 (1994) (rejecting on privacy grounds a Privacy
Act request by unions for home addresses of federal employ-
ees for the purposes of contacting them about union mem-
bership); U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991)
(holding that disclosure to an attorney of unredacted address
information to assist Haitian immigrants who unsuccessfully
sought political asylum in the United States was not war-
ranted under the FOIA); Dep't ofJustice v. Reporters Comm.
for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (rejecting a
journalist's FOIA request for a FBI rap sheet of a reputed
crime figure suspected of bribing a congressman to obtain a
federal contract on grounds that releasing the information
would be an invasion of privacy because the rap sheet would
not shed any light on official agency operations or activities);
Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615
(1982) (rejecting ajournalist's FOIA request for FBI reports
requested by President Nixon, who ordered FBI background
checks on his political enemies, on grounds that information
originally compiled for law enforcement purposes does not
lose its privacy-exemption status merely because the informa-
tion is reproduced in a new document that is not for law en-
forcement purposes); Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co.,
456 U.S. 595 (1982) (rejecting a FOIA request by The Wash-
ington Post for passport application information on two Ira-
nian nationals who traveled under the protection of United
States passports during a period of strained relations between
Iran and the United States). These cases concerned either
the personal privacy exemption, Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C.
§552(b) (6) (2000), or the privacy subsection of the law en-
forcement exemption, Exemption 7, 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (7) (C)
(2000).
305 Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1,
2001).
306 Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§2201-07 (2000)
(governing the official records of Presidents and Vice Presi-
dents created or received afterJanuary 20, 1981).
307 Id. at §2204(a).
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COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
as well as former Presidents, the right to withhold
presidential papers3111 Bush's executive order
takes control of presidential papers away from the
National Archives of the United States.
°3 0 '
Under Bush's order, journalists, historians,
scholars, public citizens' groups and the general
public now must demonstrate a specific need in
order to obtain the presidential documents of
Presidents Reagan, George Bush, Sr. and William
Jefferson Clinton.3 1 The Presidential Records
Act, which went into effect in 1981, would have
made Reagan's papers available after the current
President Bush was elected.3 11 However, those pa-
pers were not released because the current Bush
Administration undertook a review of the policy
shortly after Bush was elected. 3 12 As a result,
68,000 pages of communications between Presi-
dent Reagan and his advisers were withheld even
though officials at the National Archives, includ-
ing the Reagan Library, wanted them made pub-
lic. 31 3 The White House defended the decision,
saying that premature disclosure of confidential
decision memos could stifle candid conversations
among presidential advisers and the President.
3 14
Restrictions on access have been imposed re-
cently on the state level as well. In a 2002 Illinois
case, the federal government thwarted a newspa-
per reporter's efforts to obtain the names of fed-
eral inmates in a county jail.31 5 The reporter
sought the names of all inmates held in the De-
Witt County jail under the Illinois Freedom of In-
formation Act. 316 After she obtained the names of
the Illinois prisoners, the federal government in-
tervened to prevent the release of the names of
federal prisoners. The government removed the
case to federal district court in Illinois,317 and the
308 Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1,
2001).
309 See id. See also Steven L. Hensen, The President's Papers
Are the People's Business, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2001, at BI (ad-
vocating a return to open presidential records and the im-
portance of access to presidential documents).
310 Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1,
2001).
311 See generally 44 U.S.C. §§2201-07 (2000).
312 George Lardner Jr., Bush Clamping Down on Presiden-
tial Papers, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2001, at A33.
3 13 Id.
314 Richard Reeves, Writing History to Executive Order, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at A25.




district judge held that the names of federal pris-
oners could be withheld on privacy grounds. 318 In
Brady-Lunny v. Massey, the district court said that
providing a list of the names of inmates would
constitute "an unreasonable invasion of privacy"
because some of the inmates are "merely wit-
nesses and detainees who have not been charged
with or convicted of crimes."'3 19 The court said re-
leasing their names would "stigmatize these indi-
viduals" and may cause "irreparable damage to
their reputations.."320 The district court's rationale
does not, however, explain why the privacy inter-
ests of witnesses and detainees in custody justify
withholding names of federal inmates who have
been charged with and convicted of crimes.
In Florida, a state with open-records laws that
have been regarded as a model for other states, a
court of appeals last July upheld the constitution-
ality of a new privacy exemption for autopsy
photos. The public-record status of autopsy
photos was restricted by the Florida Legislature af-
ter the death of race-car driver Dale Earnhardt
when a Florida newspaper sought Earnhardt's au-
topsy records. 321 He was killed in a crash at Day-
tona in February 2001.322 The records were sealed
after a judge ruled that release of the photos
would violate the privacy of Earnhardt's widow.
32 3
The Earnhardt/Family Protection Act now allows
release of such materials only by a judge's or-
der.
324
In Indiana, the state legislature failed last
March in its attempt to override Governor Frank
O'Bannon's veto of an anti-access bill approved
overwhelmingly by the legislature. 325 The bill,
which had passed 71-28 in the state's House,
would have allowed legislators to decide what leg-
318 Id. at 931-32.
319 Id. at 932.
320 Id.
321 Campus Communications, Inc. v. Earnhardt, 821
So.2d 388, 394-95 (5th Cir. 2002).
322 THE BRECHNER CENTER FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMA-
TION, COLLEGE OF JOURNALISM & COMMUNICATIONS, UNIVER-
SITY OF FLORIDA, New Law Closes Autopsy Photos, 25 THE
BRECHNER REPORT I (May 2001); Newspaper Sues for Earnhardt
Pictures, 25 THE BRECHNER REPORT 1 (May 2001).
323 THE BRECHNER CENTER FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMA-
TION, COLLEGE OF JOURNALISM & COMMUNICATIONS, UNIVER-
SITY OF FLORIDA, Media Mounts Challenge to Earnhardt Law, 26
THE BRECHNER REPORT 1 (Mar. 2002).
"324 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §406.135(1) (2001).
325 Michele McNeil Solida, Lawmakers Vote to Retain State's
Open-Records Law, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 14, 2002, at Al.
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islative records could be made public. E-mail files
were among the records the bill would have made
confidential.3 26 The bill's supporters argued that
the proposed law was necessary to protect corre-
spondence from constituents on personal mat-
ters.
3 2 7
Finally, and remarkably, in 2002, the National
Zoo in Washington, D.C., denied The Washington
Post access to the medical records of a giraffe that
had died, on the grounds that disclosure would
violate the dead animal's privacy rights.3 28 Zoo Di-
rector Lucy Spelman told The Post that "privacy
rules that apply to human medical records, and
the physician-patient relationship, do not apply in
precisely the same way to animal medicine at a
public institution like the National Zoo. But we
believe they do in principle." 32
9
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The tension between individual privacy and
public/press access to government-controlled in-
formation and activities represents a conflict be-
tween important competing values that serve de-
mocracy and help structure public discourse. Pri-
vacy laws protect individual interests and the right
to be let alone. Privacy also is necessary to form
intimate relationships and make decisions regard-
ing deeply personal matters. The ability to con-
ceal aspects of one's identity is necessary for per-
sonal freedom and is an integral part of the politi-
cal process. On the other hand, access laws pro-
tect social interests and advance the democratic
principle of holding accountable those who gov-
ern us. The news media sometime invade per-
sonal privacy when they seek access to govern-
ment records containing information on private
326 Michele McNeil Solida, Lawmakers Vote to Shield Their
Records, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 30, 2001, at A4.
327 Id.
328 See AccEsS REPORTS, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, JOUR-
NAL OF NEWS AND DEVELOPMENTS, OPINION & ANALYSIS, Na-
tional Zoo Asserts Animal Privacy, May 8, 2002, at 9.
3 29 See id.
'330 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965).
331 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
332 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Han-
Ion v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999); Lauro v. City of New York,
39 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). It is of historical interest
that the Fourth Amendment has roots in disputes between
individuals or when they report on the perform-
ance of governmental services such as law enforce-
ment agencies. Such newsgathering practices,
however, can serve the right to know by advancing
the general public's need for government infor-
mation for the purpose of making informed deci-
sions concerning self-rule.
The rise of constitutional privacy has increased
this tension. Constitutional privacy has taken sev-
eral forms, deriving mainly from the rationale
that zones of privacy, implicit in the First, Third,
Fourth and Ninth Amendments, protect individu-
als from governmental intrusion. 330 Early court
opinions that first recognized a right to privacy
held that an individual has a right to be free of
governmental interference when it comes to
those autonomous decisions that enable people to
have control over their lives and private behav-
ior.3 31 Those same decisions later provided the
foundation for a series of court holdings that pro-
hibited certain newsgathering practices on the
theory that law enforcement agencies violated
Fourth Amendment privacy interests. 332 In these
Fourth Amendment privacy decisions, which con-
cerned governmental cooperation with journalists
gathering information for news stories, courts
held that it was unconstitutional for law enforce-
ment authorities to permit journalists to have ac-
cess to a private residence133 or to private prop-
erty334 during the execution of a warrant and to
arrange a "perp walk" so journalists could film a
criminal suspect for a news program.
3 35
A second stream of constitutional privacy, infor-
mation privacy, emerged in a clash with public
and press interests in access to government-held
information. 336 In a Sixth Circuit decision, a fed-
eral court of appeals held that information pri-
the press and the Crown, first in England and later in the
Colonies. See Stanford v. Texas 379 U.S. 476 (1965) ("[W]hile
the Fourth Amendment was most immediately the product of
contemporary revulsion against a regime of writs of assis-
tance, its roots go far deeper. Its adoption in the Constitution
of this new Nation reflected the culmination in England a
few years earlier of a struggle against oppression which had
endured for centuries .... What is significant to note is that
this history is largely a history of conflict between the Crown
and the press." Id. at 482. See also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE
SPEECH IN AN OPEN SocIETv 274 (1992).
333 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 605-06.
334 Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 810.
335 Lauro, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 351.




vacy overrode the Ohio Public Records Act that
had allowed public access to police personnel-file
information. 337 Information privacy was first rec-
ognized two decades earlier by the Whalen
Court,338 and although some leading legal experts
agree that Whalen marks the first time the Court
recognized information privacy, 339 this area of
constitutional privacy has yet to develop with
clearly defined boundaries.
3 40
Finally, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court recog-
nized for the first time a constitutional right of
privacy concerning disclosure of private informa-
tion obtained from a nongovernmental source.
34 1
Arguably, Bartnicki recognizes constitutional pro-
tection for "truthful private facts." 342 Bartnicki dif-
fers notably from the other constitutional privacy
cases examined in this analysis because it does not
concern state action, but focuses instead on third-
party incursions - the privacy interest being the
statutory privacy advanced by the wiretap laws and
violated by the news media. The Bartnicki Court
acknowledged that this privacy interest qualifies
for constitutional protection. However, the major-
ity also ruled that under the facts in this particular
case, First Amendment protections must prevail.
Bartnicki resonates with information privacy in
that the interest the Court was asked to protect
was essentially the right of the individual to avoid
disclosure about personal information. Implicit
throughout the Court's reasoning is the core idea
that there is an important state interest in a law
that shields personal information about an indi-
vidual from disclosure. This concept is analogous
to the information privacy interest considered in
337 Id. at 1069-70.
338 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
339 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRIN-
CIPLES AND POLICIES 826 (2002). FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 62-63 (1997).
340 See Bunker, supra note 122, at 584-87. First Amend-
ment scholar Bunker and his colleagues, in reviewing the de-
Kallstrom - the right of the individual to control
information about oneself. Bartnicki does not un-
controvertibly establish a new constitutional right
for the protection of private facts. As the
O'Connor-Breyer concurrence makes clear, the
decision easily could have gone the other way.
343
Bartnicki's implications for constitutionally pro-
tected private facts privacy or information privacy,
therefore, remains elusive. Still, Bartnicki contrib-
utes to the emergence of some form of constitu-
tional protection for private information, despite
its uncertain and protracted development.
The problem posed by the rise of constitution-
ally protected privacy is that when constitutional
privacy is presented as a bar to access of govern-
ment-controlled operations or records, judicial re-
flection to consider the benefits of public and
press access is severely constrained, if not elimi-
nated. In a conflict between privacy and access in-
terests, the overarching question should not be
whether there has been an invasion of privacy,
but, rather, whether there has been an unwar-
ranted invasion of privacy. The trumping power of
constitutional privacy can undercut judicial power
to make this important distinction. In these times,
with concerns about privacy reaching unprece-
dented levels as current statutory and regulatory
trends demonstrate, it becomes apparent how the
uniquely powerful force of constitutional privacy
can dangerously threaten a crucial balance which,
as Professor Westin warned in the years before
privacy law mushroomed, must be maintained to
preserve democracy and keep government re-
sponsible.
velopment of information privacy in cases up to and includ-
ing Whalen and Nixon, concluded that "[t]aken together,
these cases suggest there is as yet no firm constitutional right
to informational privacy." Id. at 587.
341 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535.
342 See Goodale, supra note 196.
343 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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